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INTRODUCTION
Zoning disputes provide many Americans with their only firsthand
exposure to the workings of democratic government. Land use issues
trigger participation because neighbors perceive the wrong kind of
development as posing a double-barreled threat to the stability of the
community in which they have chosen to live and to the economic value
of their homes.
The protagonists in zoning disputes—landowners and neighbors—
invest time and other resources to persuade the relevant decisionmakers
to rule in the protagonists’ favor. When the parties make that
investment, should they assume that a decision made today will have
some enduring significance? Whether the decision is “final” may play
an important role in shaping the parties’ participation and presentations.
If a zoning board were free to deny a variance today and to grant the
identical variance next week (or next year), there would be less reason
for neighbors (and landowner applicants) to spend time and money
framing their arguments for today’s decision.
Many of the reasons that underlie res judicata doctrine apply to
these local land use disputes. In the interest of conserving the resources
of all parties—landowners, neighbors, and local decisionmakers—
issues should be decided once, not multiple times. There is little reason
to think that, were the issues decided multiple times, subsequent
determinations would improve on prior ones. This is especially true in
the context of land use, where the issues involve primarily questions of
fact, and parties have incentives to come forward with all relevant
information at the time the first decisionmaker considers the dispute.
If a court, rather than a zoning board, were resolving the dispute, res
judicata doctrine would circumscribe the power of a subsequent court to
depart from the earlier determination. In the first instance, however,
zoning disputes are resolved not by the courts, but by local legislatures
and administrative bodies. No finality principle comparable to res
judicata attaches to legislative determinations, no matter which
legislative body—Congress, a state legislature, or a local city council—
makes those determinations. Unlike most judicial decisions, which
resolve discrete disputes over past events, legislatures act prospectively.
Finality rules would preclude legislative decisionmakers from
considering new facts that cast doubt on the wisdom of past decisions. It
should not be surprising, then, that legislatures are typically free of
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finality constraints.
In contrast to the well-established principles that apply to judicial
and legislative determinations, the applicability of finality principles is
unclear when it comes to administrative decisions by the local zoning
board, such as the grant or denial of a variance. Courts sometimes treat
zoning board decisions as if they were judicial decisions, using res
judicata language to preclude new applications for relief that the zoning
board previously denied. In other cases, courts—often from the same
jurisdictions—permit boards to entertain applications virtually identical
to previously rejected applications. Although courts sometimes suggest
the need to be “flexible” in applying res judicata doctrine to zoning
disputes, neither courts nor scholars have offered a coherent prescriptive
or descriptive account for how that flexibility does or should operate.
This Article has two related objectives: to develop a normative
theory explaining how finality principles should apply in the land use
context and simultaneously to argue that existing case law, however
inarticulately, reflects that normative theory. Part I begins by exploring
the distinctive structure of zoning doctrine, which fits imperfectly with
traditional categorization of decisions as legislative or judicial. Part II
examines more generally the role of finality in legal decisionmaking.
Part III demonstrates that, in light of the structure of zoning doctrine,
traditional claim preclusion doctrine should have no place in zoning
law. This Article argues, by contrast, that issue preclusion doctrine
should and does operate to constrain zoning decisionmakers. The
Article goes on to demonstrate that this framework explains the results,
even if not the language, in the vast majority of zoning cases that raise
finality issues.
I. THE STRUCTURE OF LAND USE LAW
The starting point for most current zoning law begins with the
Euclidean technique1 of dividing the municipality into districts, or
zones, that separate incompatible uses. One might imagine this system
operating mechanically: once the districts are established, all
development proceeds as a matter of right. In practice, however, that is
not how the zoning system has developed. Instead, zoning and land use
issues require the exercise of judgment, not the application of
mechanical rules.
A. The Discretionary Nature of the Land Use Process
Discretion and judgment play important roles in the zoning process
1. From its inception, land use law’s focus has been on regulation of externalities. In
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387–88, 394–95 (1926), the U.S. Supreme
Court sustained the practice of zoning by analogizing it to nuisance law and emphasizing the
effect that the use of one parcel of land might have on neighboring parcels.
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primarily for two reasons. First, in any municipality of significant size,
even the most well-intentioned and capable officials will be unable to
anticipate the effect of a zoning ordinance on each and every parcel of
land.2 Some restrictions on use or area may make particular parcels
valueless. The compatibility of other uses with surrounding parcels may
depend on individualized determinations not easily captured in a code.
As a result, zoning ordinances typically have provisions that enable
landowners to obtain administrative relief from strict application of the
ordinance.3
Second, municipalities generally have incentives to subject most
new construction to discretionary review. A regime in which the
municipality has power to impose conditions on development approvals
enables the municipality to extract benefits from developers that would
not be obtainable in a system where development proceeds “as of
right.”4 For a large project, those benefits might include parkland or
infrastructure improvements; for a smaller project, benefits might
2. As the Supreme Court of California explained in Rubin v. Board of Directors, 104
P.2d 1041 (Cal. 1940):
A zoning ordinance places limitations upon the use of land within certain
areas in accordance with a general policy which has been adopted. But because
compliance with the ordinance may present unusual difficulties as to certain
property, almost every zoning ordinance includes provisions under which an
owner may apply to an administrative board for permission to put his land to a
non-conforming use. This procedure . . . provides the opportunity “for
amelioration of unnecessary hardships which, owing to special conditions,
would result from literal enforcement of the restrictive features of the
ordinance.”
Id. at 1043 (quoting Thayer v. Bd. of Appeals, 157 A. 273, 275 (Conn. 1931)).
3. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2309 (2011) (authorizing boards of zoning appeals to
grant variances and special exceptions to landowners).
4. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that the power to impose conditions on
development approvals gives municipalities considerable leverage over developers, and it has
attempted to constrain municipalities by requiring a “nexus” between the permit condition and
the reasons for requiring development approval. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825,
837 & n.5 (1987); see also Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 386–87 (1994) (explaining
and applying the “nexus” requirement announced in Nollan). See generally Mark Fenster,
Takings Formalism and Regulatory Formulas: Exactions and the Consequences of Clarity, 92
CAL. L. REV. 609 (2004).
To make significant changes to the existing use of their land—changes such as
subdividing parcels, initiating major development, or shifting the type or
intensity of use—property owners typically must seek one or more
discretionary approvals from the jurisdiction’s zoning authority or legislative
body. During this process, local governments and property owners often
negotiate over the exactions an applicant will accept as conditions for issuance
of the necessary planning approval.
Id. at 623 (citations omitted).
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include planting trees or improving drainage by reducing impervious
surfaces. Discretionary review comes in various forms. A landowner
who wants to develop her property in a way not permitted by the zoning
ordinance may seek amendment of the ordinance itself, either to permit
a new use in the existing district or to include the landowner’s parcel in
a different district. Amendment of the ordinance, like enactment of the
ordinance itself, is generally the province of the municipal legislature,
often known as the city council or town board.5
Alternatively, a landowner can seek a variance from the local
administrative body—typically the zoning board of appeals or board of
adjustment—to use the landowner’s property in a manner not permitted
within the district as currently zoned.6 Variances provide a “safety
valve” for landowners who can establish that strict application of the
ordinance would cause hardship (that is, the landowner could not obtain
a reasonable return on the land as zoned), and thus avoid the need for
frequent zoning amendments.7 Most ordinances require a landowner
who seeks a “use” variance to establish, in addition to hardship, that the
hardship is unique to the landowner’s parcel, and that granting the
variance will not have an adverse impact on the surrounding
neighborhood.8 Less stringent requirements usually apply to
applications for “area” variances, which permit the landowner to modify
setback requirements or other square footage requirements, but not to
use the land in a manner otherwise prohibited by the ordinance.9
Ordinances also make provision for special-use permits, sometimes
called “conditional-use permits” or “special exceptions.”10 Although
5. In some jurisdictions, the municipal legislature must refer amendments to a local
planning commission or planning board before enacting an amendment. See, e.g., VA. CODE
ANN. § 15.2-2285.
6. See, e.g., id. § 15.2-2309(2).
7. See David W. Owens, The Zoning Variance: Reappraisal and Recommendations for
Reform of a Much-Maligned Tool, 29 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 279, 283–84 (2004) (citations
omitted) (noting that variances were designed to limit both constitutional attacks and frequent
zoning amendments).
8. See, e.g., N.Y. TOWN LAW § 267-b(2)(b) (McKinney 2011); see also 23 AM. JUR. 3D
Proof of Facts § 13 (2011). The landowner must generally show:
(1) [T]he land in question cannot yield a reasonable return if used only for a
purpose allowed in that zone; (2) that the plight of the owner is due to unique
circumstances and not to the general conditions in the neighborhood which may
reflect the unreasonableness of the zoning ordinance itself; and (3) that the use
to be authorized by the variance will not alter the essential character of the
locality.
Otto v. Steinhilber, 24 N.E.2d 851, 853 (N.Y. 1939).
9. See, e.g., N.Y. TOWN LAW §§ 267(1)(b), 267-b(3)(b).
10. See, e.g., id. § 274-b. For a general discussion of the terminology, see 3 ARDEN H.
RATHKOPF & DAREN A. RATHKOPF, RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING AND P LANNING § 61:9 (4th
ed. 2010).
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specially permitted uses explicitly are authorized by the zoning
ordinance, the ordinance authorizes an administrative body to impose
conditions that minimize the impact of the use on the surrounding
community.11 Schools and churches are common specially permitted
uses in residential districts. Although these uses are generally
compatible with residential neighbors, concerns about traffic patterns,
parking, and noise prevent many municipalities from authorizing these
uses “as of right”; the special permit process thus enables an
administrative body to protect the interests of neighbors.12
Municipal land use ordinances typically offer still more
opportunities for the exercise of municipal discretion, often requiring
subdivision review13 or site plan review14 for significant development
projects. The basic point, however, is that the land use process is rife
with opportunities for the exercise of judgment by municipal officials.
B. The Decisionmakers
Responsibility for zoning approvals is not typically centralized in a
single decisionmaker. Zoning amendments tend to be the province of an
elected local legislature, members of which often have no legal
background. Although a landowner often makes the initial proposal for
a zoning amendment, the local legislature generally does not owe the
landowner any obligation to consider the amendment or to conduct a
hearing. However, if the legislature favors the proposed amendment, the
legislature may not enact an amendment without a public hearing.15
Variances and special-use permits, by contrast, typically fall within
the purview of the zoning board of appeals or board of adjustment (the
“zoning board” or “board”).16 Members of the board, generally
11. See, e.g., N.Y. TOWN LAW § 274-b(1)–(2).
12. See, for example, Creswell v. Baltimore Aviation Service, Inc., 264 A.2d 838 (Md.
1970):
[T]he special exception is a valid zoning mechanism that delegates to an
administrative board a limited authority to permit enumerated uses which the
legislative body has determined can, prima facie, properly be allowed in a
specified use district, absent any fact or circumstance in a particular case which
would change this presumptive finding.
Id. at 842 (quoting Rockville Fuel & Feed Co. v. Bd. of Appeals, 262 A.2d 499, 502 (Md.
1970) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
13. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2241 (2011).
14. See, e.g., id. § 15.2-2246.
15. See, e.g., id. § 15.2-2285(C) (requiring public hearing before governing body
approves zoning amendment, but not requiring a hearing when governing body decides not to
act).
16. See, e.g., id. § 15.2-2309 (delineating powers of boards of zoning appeals, including
authorization of variances and special exceptions); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-70 (West 2011)
(conferring similar powers on board of adjustment).
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appointed by the local legislature,17 are required to consider applications
for variances and special-use permits, often within a statutorily
mandated time frame.18 The board must conduct public hearings on
each application and make decisions based on the record.19 Even when
not required by statute, good practice requires the board to make
findings to accompany its decision. Although the functions of the
zoning board might be categorized as quasi-judicial, members of the
board—like members of the legislature—do not need (and often do not
have) legal training.
However, judicial review is available to landowners or neighbors
dissatisfied with the decision made by either body. In most states, courts
will not overturn a zoning amendment unless the challenger can
demonstrate that the amendment violates the Constitution or exceeds the
authority state law confers on the local legislature.20 When a zoning
board grants or denies a variance or special-use permit, courts review
the determination for consistency with applicable statutory or common
law standards, but give considerable deference to the board’s weighing
of statutory considerations.21
C. Multiple Applications: The Finality Problem
What consequences flow from an administrative body’s
determination to deny (or to grant) a landowner’s application? Of
course, an aggrieved landowner or neighbor can challenge the
determination directly in court. But can a landowner simply apply
again, hoping for a different result? To what extent is the municipal
body’s decision final?
17. See, e.g., N.Y. TOWN LAW § 267(2) (McKinney 2011). Virginia has an unusual
provision calling for a circuit court to appoint members of local boards of zoning appeals. VA.
CODE ANN. § 15.2-2308(A).
18. See, e.g., N.Y. TOWN LAW § 267-a(8) (requiring decision within sixty-two days of
public hearing).
19. Cf. Twin Cnty. Recycling Corp. v. Yevoli, 688 N.E.2d 501, 502 (N.Y. 1997) (holding
that denial of a special-use permit was improper when based on community pressure rather than
record evidence).
20. See, e.g., Taylor v. Canyon Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 210 P.3d 532, 539 (Idaho 2009)
(holding that action by county board of commissioners must be upheld unless the action is
inconsistent with statutory mandates). By contrast, a number of state courts scrutinize zoning
amendments more carefully. Some treat zoning amendments as “quasi-judicial” actions
requiring an evidentiary showing that the amendment is consistent with a plan. See, e.g., Fasano
v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 507 P.2d 23, 26, 29 (Or. 1973). In other states, proponents of a zoning
amendment must demonstrate that the existing ordinance was the product of mistake, or that a
change in circumstances has subsequently occurred. See, e.g., Clayman v. Prince George’s
Cnty., 292 A.2d 689, 693–94 (Md. 1972).
21. See, e.g., Bontrager Auto Serv., Inc. v. Iowa City Bd. of Adjustment, 748 N.W.2d
483, 496–97 (Iowa 2008) (applying a substantial evidence standard and holding that when the
reasonableness of a board’s decision is open to “a fair difference of opinion,” the board’s
decision should be affirmed).
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Consider a concrete example. Suppose a zoning ordinance requires
houses in a single-family district to be situated on lots of at least one
acre. Suppose further that a landowner with a 1.75-acre parcel of land
seeks a variance to permit construction of two houses on the property.
The zoning board denies the variance. Five months—or five years—
later, the landowner seeks a similar variance. What is the effect of the
previous variance denial? Must the zoning board deny the new
application based on principles of claim or issue preclusion? Even if the
zoning board is not compelled to deny the new application on preclusion
grounds, may the board invoke claim or issue preclusion to avoid
evaluating the subsequent application without a public hearing22 on the
merits?23
Although cases raising these finality questions occur frequently,
neither courts nor academics have provided a coherent framework for
analyzing them. Courts recognize the importance of finality and often
invoke preclusion principles, but they just as frequently reject the
application of preclusion principles to nearly identical situations. While
leading treatises discuss the finality problem, they are largely content to
collect the cases and discuss them individually.24 Careful analysis of the
problem requires an understanding of the role of finality in government
decisions more generally, a subject to which this Article now turns.
II. FINALITY IN GOVERNMENTAL DECISIONS
Finality principles distinguish sharply between legislative and
judicial decisionmaking. Although the U.S. Constitution precludes a
legislature from imposing retroactive criminal penalties,25 legislators
enjoy almost complete freedom to ignore or reverse the decisions of
their predecessors in civil matters. The federal and state constitutions
typically authorize legislation to promote the public welfare, even if that
legislation significantly impairs reliance interests. The Takings and
22. See 1 ARDEN H. RATHKOPF & DAREN A. RATHKOPF, RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING
P LANNING § 2:3 (4th ed. 2010) (“As a procedural requirement, due process generally
requires . . . a ‘fair hearing’ when governmental bodies adjudicate, or perform the quasi-judicial
function of determining the rights of a particular landowner in regard to the use and
development of his land under criteria for approval set out in a zoning code.”).
23. While courts typically defer to zoning board determinations of land use applications,
Cowan v. Kern, 363 N.E.2d 305, 310 (N.Y. 1977), courts will not defer to the extent that the
board’s behavior is arbitrary and capricious. Anderson v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 217 P.3d 401,
405 (Wyo. 2009) (quoting Dale v. S & S Builders, LLC, 188 P.3d 554, 561 (Wyo. 2008)) (“We
continue to apply the arbitrary and capricious standard as a ‘safety net’ designed to ‘catch
agency action which prejudices a party’s substantial rights . . . .’”). A board determination made
without consideration of the merits of the claim certainly would be arbitrary and capricious—
unless preclusion principles excused the board from reconsidering the merits.
24. See 4 ARDEN H. RATHKOPF & DAREN A. RATHKOPF, RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING
AND PLANNING §§ 68:11–68:17 (4th ed. 2009) (discussing results in various categories of cases);
4 PATRICIA E. SALKIN, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING §§ 40:49–40:53 (5th ed. 2010) (same).
25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
AND
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Contract Clauses impose modest constraints, at most, on legislative
power to change policy.26
In the legislative context, democracy requires the subordination of
finality to flexibility. A democratic system permits proponents of a
particular policy to introduce new data to persuade legislators and
voters, and permits those decisionmakers to change course based on
either the new data or a different evaluation of old data. As a result,
today’s decisions about how to provide health care and how to regulate
financial markets do not preclude subsequent Congresses or state
legislatures from repealing or amending the laws.
By contrast, when judicial decisions are at issue, finality principles
often close the door to judicial reconsideration of previously decided
matters. When two parties have obtained judicial resolution of their
dispute, claim preclusion and issue preclusion principles bind both the
parties and a subsequent court to that resolution, even if the court
believes the prior court’s decision was incorrect on the facts or the
law.27
Why should finality be more critical when judicial decisions are at
stake than when the decisions are legislative? And where do zoning
decisions fit within that framework? Answering those questions requires
an understanding of the reasons for finality principles generally.
A. The Foundations of Preclusion Doctrine
Preclusion doctrine rests on a combination of efficiency and
fairness concerns. First, precluding relitigation of previously decided
issues conserves judicial resources.28 Permitting relitigation either
26. The Takings Clause in the Fifth Amendment prohibits the taking of private property
for public use without just compensation, and therefore potentially makes it more expensive for
the government to change decisions that adversely affect private property rights. See generally
Stewart E. Sterk, The Federalist Dimension of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 114 YALE
L.J. 203, 210–14 (2004) (noting that the Takings Clause protects primarily against legal
change). But the Takings Clause rarely operates to invalidate state and local land use regulation,
unless the regulation deprives a landowner of all economic use of its land. See, e.g., Lucas v.
S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992).
The Contracts Clause in Article I of the Constitution also makes it more expensive for
legislatures to change course, by requiring them to abide by their contracts. The Supreme Court,
however, has rarely invoked the Contracts Clause to invalidate state legislation. But see U.S.
Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 32 (1977).
27. Claim and issue preclusion are not the only principles that recognize the importance of
finality in judicial decisions. Stare decisis often leads courts to abide by past decisions with
which they disagree. The stare decisis command, however, is a relatively weaker mandate than
claim and issue preclusion. Although adherence to precedent is the general rule, American
courts universally accept the principle that courts should, at least sometimes, be free to overrule
past precedent.
28. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS ch. 1, at 11 (1982) (“Indefinite
continuation of a dispute is a social burden. It consumes time and energy that may be put to
other use, not only of the parties but of the community as a whole. . . . The law of res judicata
reduces these burdens . . . .”). Similarly, the Supreme Court has observed that res judicata “has
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would require more judges, or would require that a fixed corps of judges
devote less attention to new issues not previously subject to litigation.
Moreover, because subsequent judges are, as a class, no more likely to
reach an accurate outcome than prior judges, the additional resources
expended on relitigation would not generate commensurate benefits.29
Second, precluding relitigation improves the quality of
decisionmaking by increasing the incentive for litigating parties to
advance all of their arguments and to marshal all of their evidence at
once.30 In most jurisdictions, preclusion doctrine prevents parties from
splitting claims in ways that allow them to “save” arguments and
evidence for a subsequent proceeding, should they lose the first time
around.31
Third, from a fairness perspective, preclusion protects a successful
litigant from having to expend time and resources defending against
duplicative litigation.32 By denying litigants a second bite at the apple,
preclusion doctrine advances a policy of repose.33
Each of these rationales for preclusion doctrine could also be
applied in the context of legislation. If legislators could not revisit past
decisions, they could devote more time to new issues. Lobbyists would
have more incentive to come forward in the first instance if legislators
were bound by their initial decisions. Citizens who once prevailed in the
legislative process would be relieved from the fear that legislators
would later succumb to pressure by those who had previously lost in the
process.
There are, however, critical differences between the judicial and
legislative processes that explain why preclusion doctrines generally do
not apply to legislation. Perhaps the most important is that legislation
typically
applies
prospectively
while
litigation
operates
retrospectively.34 Legislative decisions involve prediction about the
the dual purpose of protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue with the
same party or his privy and of promoting judicial economy by preventing needless litigation.”
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979) (citing Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v.
Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 328–29 (1971)).
29. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS ch. 1, at 10 (“[F]inality attaches not
because the courts are infallible but because they are inevitably fallible.”).
30. Cf. id. at 8–10 (noting that strict rules of finality are more appropriate in a legal
regime that permits and encourages parties to raise all of their legal claims in a single
proceeding).
31. Cf. id. § 24 cmt. a (“The law of res judicata now reflects the expectation that parties
who are given the capacity to present their ‘entire controversies’ shall in fact do so.”).
32. See Isaac v. Truck Serv., Inc., 752 A.2d 509, 513 (Conn. 2000) (identifying one policy
of res judicata as “provid[ing] repose by preventing a person from being harassed by vexatious
litigation”).
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS ch. 1, at 11 (“[The law of res judicata] holds
that at some point arguable questions of right and wrong for practical purposes simply cannot be
argued any more. It compels repose.”).
34. Note also that preclusion in litigation only binds parties to the litigation; preclusion in
the legislative arena would bind everyone, including those who originally had little reason to
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effects particular decisions will produce in the future, while litigation
focuses on concrete events that occurred in the past. All of the
information about past events is, at least theoretically, available when a
court makes its decision. The same is not true of prospective legislative
decisions. As time passes, new information will emerge that confirms or
undermines the predictions on which the legislative decision was
premised.35 A rule precluding reconsideration of the decision would
disable legislatures from incorporating that information into policy
decisions.
More generally, rules precluding relitigation of disputes pose little
threat to democratic decisionmaking because legislatures remain free to
overturn any policies embodied in a past judgment. By contrast, a rule
precluding repeal or modification of existing legislation would impose
intolerable constraints on the power of subsequent legislatures to
implement policy choices preferred by contemporary constituents.36
Two related doctrines embody the prohibition against duplicative
litigation. Claim preclusion doctrine (often referred to by its more
traditional label, res judicata) provides that a judgment in favor of either
party to a litigation extinguishes all of the claims the plaintiff could
have advanced against the defendant arising out of the same set of
transactions that gave rise to the claim the plaintiff actually advanced.37
The basic principle is that parties with an opportunity to present an
entire controversy within a single proceeding must do so.38 A final
judgment precludes a party from bringing a subsequent proceeding,
even if the party seeks to advance new theories, present new evidence,
or obtain different remedies.39
Issue preclusion doctrine (traditionally known as collateral estoppel)
operates both more broadly and more narrowly than claim preclusion
doctrine. When a party has unsuccessfully litigated an issue in a
proceeding, issue preclusion prevents relitigation of that issue, even in a
subsequent proceeding on an unrelated claim.40 On the other hand, the
worry about the legislation’s impact and therefore little incentive to participate in the legislative
process.
35. Cf. Kenneth Culp Davis, Res Judicata in Administrative Law, 25 TEX. L. REV. 199,
204 (1947) (noting that in areas where “lively problems of law” arise, decisionmakers should
“not be barred from using trial-and-error methods” of resolving legal questions).
36. Cf. Stewart E. Sterk, The Continuity of Legislatures: Of Contracts and the Contracts
Clause, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 647, 647 (1988) (noting that “in a democratic system, legislatures
are generally free to reverse” policy choices).
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24(1) (providing that claim preclusion
doctrine extinguishes “all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to
all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action
arose”).
38. Id. § 24 cmt. a (“The law of res judicata now reflects the expectation that parties who
are given the capacity to present their ‘entire controversies’ shall in fact do so.”).
39. Id. § 25.
40. Id. § 27 (“When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid
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doctrine applies only to claims actually litigated and necessarily
determined. Issue preclusion does not apply to an issue or theory a party
could have raised in a prior proceeding, but did not.41
While the application of preclusion principles to judicial decisions
has a long pedigree, it is equally well-established that preclusion
principles do not apply to legislative decisions. It is less clear how these
principles apply to zoning determinations and other decisions that do
not fit neatly into the “legislative” and “judicial” categories.
B. Application to Administrative Proceedings
With the advent and growth of administrative agencies, courts and
scholars grappled over whether preclusion principles should apply to
administrative decisions that shared some, but not all, of the hallmarks
associated with court judgments.42 But it has long since been clear that
preclusion principles are ill-suited to agency rulemaking decisions.43
But even when agencies act in a more adjudicative mode, agency
decisions do not provide all of the trappings familiar to adversarial
judicial proceedings. For instance, agencies need not follow the rules of
evidence.44 There is often no formal transcript of the proceedings.45
Moreover, statutes rigidly limit the issues agencies may decide, and
non-lawyers often make agency decisions.
Nevertheless, agency decisionmaking would be crippled if finality
and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is
conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different
claim.”).
41. Id. § 27 cmt. e (“A judgment is not conclusive in a subsequent action as to issues
which might have been but were not litigated and determined in the prior action.”). Similarly,
the judgment will not be conclusive when the issue was not recognized by the parties as
important, or not recognized by the fact-finder as necessary to the first judgment. See id. § 27
cmt. j.
42. Historically, courts refused to give administrative decisions res judicata effect because
administrative agencies are instruments of executive, not judicial, power. See, e.g., Pearson v.
Williams, 202 U.S. 281, 284–85 (1906). However, in light of the proliferation of administrative
hearings during the late twentieth century, the Supreme Court held that “[w]hen an
administrative agency [acts] in a judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues of fact . . . which
the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate,” there is “neither need nor justification
for a second evidentiary hearing on these matters already resolved as between these two
parties.” United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422 (1966). For a scholarly
discussion of preclusion principles as applied to administrative decisions, see generally Davis,
supra note 35; Rex R. Perschbacher, Rethinking Collateral Estoppel: Limiting the Preclusive
Effect of Administrative Determinations in Judicial Proceedings, 35 FLA. L. REV. 422 (1983).
43. Among the reasons for the mismatch between preclusion and rulemaking is the
absence of identified parties in most rulemaking contexts. See Davis, supra note 35, at 230 &
n.132.
44. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30A, § 11(2) (West 2010).
45. In some states, statutes require zoning boards to provide a verbatim recording of
proceedings. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-10(f) (West 2011). In other states, transcripts
are unnecessary unless requested by a party willing to pay for those transcripts. See, e.g., MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30A, § 11(6).

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol63/iss5/3

12

Sterk and Brunelle: Zoning Finality: Reconceptualizing Res Judicata Doctrine in Land

2011]

ZONING FINALITY

1151

principles did not apply at all.46 If protagonists in administrative
proceedings were given unlimited freedom to bring the same claims
repeatedly, the system would be burdened by the same unfairness and
inefficiencies that preclusion rules are designed to avoid. Indeed, the
failure to apply those principles to administrative determinations would
generate perverse results: in order to obtain the benefits of finality, the
prevailing party would have an incentive to seek judicial review of a
favorable determination.47 Applying preclusion doctrine to
administrative determinations eliminates that incentive. It should not be
surprising, then, that at least since the Supreme Court’s 1966 decision in
United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co.,48 it has been clear
that res judicata principles extend to administrative determinations.
Preclusion doctrine, however, attaches only to administrative
determinations that are adjudicative, not to determinations that are
legislative or managerial.49 This distinction is justified by the same
reasons that bar application of preclusion doctrine to legislative
determinations. Rulemaking determinations tend to focus on prediction
and policy rather than on evaluation of events that have already
occurred.50 Moreover, rulemaking determinations bind parties whose
individual interests are so small that they cannot be expected to
participate in the rulemaking process.
No talismanic factor determines when an administrative
determination is sufficiently adjudicative to permit application of
preclusion principles. The more an agency’s action resembles a trial
court’s determination, the stronger the case for classifying the action as
adjudicative.51 When legal principles bind the agency to make a
decision on a legal claim, preclusion principles typically will apply, so
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 83 cmt. b (“The importance of bringing a
legal controversy te [sic] conclusion is generally no less when the tribunal is an administrative
tribunal than when it is a court.”).
47. Court judgments are, of course, entitled to res judicata effect. Therefore, were
administrative determinations given no preclusive effect, the prevailing party in an
administrative proceeding, if concerned about subsequent efforts to relitigate, would have an
incentive to seek judicial review of the administrative determination to obtain the res judicata
effect afforded to court judgments.
48. 384 U.S. 394, 422–23 (1966).
49. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 83 cmt. b.
50. Indeed, Professor Davis argued that courts sometimes focus too much effort on
labeling administrative determinations as “legislative” or “adjudicative.” He suggested, instead,
that courts should focus more on whether the reasons for preventing relitigation are present.
Thus, he argued that ratemaking decisions should not be given preclusive effect because “[a]
rate desirable for one period of time may be undesirable for another period,” regardless of
whether the ratemaking proceeding is deemed legislative or judicial. Davis, supra note 35, at
231. Conversely, “a second adjudication of static facts is undesirable in absence of some special
reason for permitting it.” Id. at 232.
51. See 2 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 13.3, at 1132 (Aspen
Publishers 5th ed. 2010) (“The starting point in drawing the line is the observation that res
judicata applies when what the agency does resembles what a trial court does.”).
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long as the agency’s procedural process provides adequate safeguards to
ensure that the parties to be bound have had a fair hearing on their
claim.52
Many zoning determinations fit squarely within the adjudicative
framework. When a zoning board considers a variance or special permit
application, or interprets a local zoning ordinance, an applicant is
entitled to a final determination of his claim, usually within a statutorily
mandated time period.53 In making that determination, the zoning board
must apply settled legal principles to the facts presented by the
applicant.54 Moreover, the board must afford notice to interested parties
(usually neighbors who own land within a specified distance from the
applicant’s parcel) and must conduct a public hearing at which all
parties have an opportunity to present and rebut evidence.55
Preclusion doctrines therefore would appear to apply to requests for
review by a zoning board. A system that allows an unsuccessful party to
reapply for the same relief month after month, requiring adversaries to
show up each month to oppose the relief and the board to decide each
repeated application anew, would be intolerable. It should not be
surprising, then, that courts find preclusion principles relevant to these
applications.
52. The Restatement treats an administrative determination as adjudicative only if the
agency determines a matter that “includes a legal claim, that is, an assertion by one party against
another cast in terms of entitlement under substantive law to particular relief.” RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 83 cmt. b. The comment goes on to provide that “[a] petition for a
benefit from the government is not a legal claim unless the agency is obliged to grant the
petition upon a showing of the existence of conditions specified by law.” Id. Once the
determination is deemed to be adjudicative, res judicata principles apply only if adequate
procedural safeguards, such as the provision of adequate notice to the parties to be bound, the
right to present and rebut evidence and argument, and the ultimate rendering of a final decision,
accompany the determination. Id. § 83(2).
53. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-73 (West 2011) (imposing a 120-day period
within which the board must render decisions).
54. See generally, e.g., id. § 40:55D-70 (providing that no variance shall be granted
“without a showing that such variance or other relief can be granted without substantial
detriment to the public good and will not substantially impair the intent and the purpose of the
zone plan and zoning ordinance”).
55. In an early, influential case, the New Jersey Supreme Court catalogued the foundation
for applying preclusion doctrine in zoning cases, focusing specifically on the creation of the
record:
To fail to accord the findings of a board of adjustment, especially where the
proceedings are formal and adversary, as is the case here, the effect of res
judicata would be most inconsistent with this goal. In addition, the function of
boards of adjustment, in deciding an application made under N.J.S.A. 40:5539(c), is essentially factfinding, as opposed to policymaking. The party seeking
the variance must present evidence sufficient to allow the board to act. Other
interested parties may be heard. The board is not entitled to act on facts not
part of the record.
Russell v. Bd. of Adjustment, 155 A.2d 83, 87 (N.J. 1959) (citations omitted).
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By contrast, when a landowner seeks a zoning amendment from a
municipal legislature, the legislature need not act on the landowner’s
request, and certainly need not do so within a specified time frame.
Although the legislature must act within the statutory authority
conferred by the state zoning enabling act, the legislature faces no other
significant legal constraints on its ultimate decision. Policy, not law, is
the legislature’s primary concern. Neither a decision to amend the
ordinance, nor a decision not to amend, has the hallmarks of an
adjudicative determination. As a result, preclusion doctrines should
not—and do not—apply to zoning amendments.56
C. Limits to Preclusion Doctrine
Neither claim nor issue preclusion doctrine provides ironclad
protection against relitigation of claims,57 regardless of whether the first
determination was made by a court or by an administrative body. Four
qualifications are particularly relevant in the context of zoning
determinations.
First, because both claim and issue preclusion are common law
doctrines, both must yield to a statutory command permitting
relitigation. Preclusion principles do not require or even allow
adherence to the first determination where a legislature has identified
justifications—such as public policy—to permit a second litigation.58
For instance, the Supreme Court has invoked a federal statute to hold
that a state agency proceeding that rejected an age-discrimination claim
56. See Price v. City of Georgetown, 375 S.E.2d 335, 337 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988) (“[T]he
doctrine of res judicata is generally held to be nonapplicable to a change of zone case because
changing a zone is a legislative act of the zoning authority . . . .”). In a number of states,
however, courts have expressed suspicion of piecemeal zoning changes, not so much because of
finality concerns, but rather because they fear that those changes may be the product of political
influence. As a result, in those states, a municipality may only amend its zoning ordinance if it
demonstrates that there has been a change in circumstances or that the original ordinance was
the product of mistake. The “change-mistake rule” is most closely associated with Maryland,
but constrains municipal power to depart from precedent in other states, as well. See, e.g.,
Clayman v. Prince George’s Cnty., 292 A.2d 689, 693–94 (Md. 1972); Bd. of Alderman v.
Conerly, 509 So. 2d 877, 883 (Miss. 1987); Albuquerque Commons P’ship v. City Council, 184
P.3d 411, 419 (N.M. 2008).
Other states treat zoning amendments as quasi-judicial and require the party seeking the
amendment to establish a need for it. The leading case is Fasano v. Board of County
Commissioners, 507 P.2d 23, 29 (Or. 1973). See also Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Snyder, 627 So.
2d 469, 476 (Fla. 1993); Cooper v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 614 P.2d 947, 950–51 (Idaho 1980).
This quasi-judicial treatment, however, is motivated not by finality concerns, but by concerns
about the “almost irresistible pressures that can be asserted by private economic interests on
local government.” Fasano, 507 P.2d at 30.
57. Exceptions to claim preclusion and issue preclusion doctrine are collected in the
Restatement (Second) of Judgments. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 26, 28.
58. See id. § 20(1)(c) (providing that a judgment for a defendant does not bar another
action by a plaintiff “[w]hen by statute or rule of court the judgment does not operate as a bar to
another action on the same claim”).
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does not bar a plaintiff from bringing the same claim in a subsequent
federal court proceeding.59
Second, if the initial forum provides that its determination should
not have preclusive effect, the plaintiff is not precluded from seeking
relief in a second forum, even if no statute supplants preclusion
doctrine. For instance, when a forum dismisses a plaintiff’s claim
“without prejudice,” the dismissal does not bar a subsequent suit.60 That
is, if the first forum concludes that the case has not yet been explored
sufficiently to preclude a subsequent action, the court may so indicate,
leaving a second forum free to hear the case.
Third, claim preclusion does not apply when a formal barrier
prevented the plaintiff from presenting the entire claim in the first
forum. In that circumstance, preclusion doctrine does not interfere with
the plaintiff’s ability to raise in a second forum those aspects of the
claim that the first forum could not adjudicate.61 Suppose, for instance,
that an employee brings a negligence action against his employer,
contending that the alleged negligence occurred outside the scope of his
employment. Suppose further that the court concludes that the
negligence occurred within the scope of the employment and dismisses
the suit, asserting that the employee’s exclusive remedy is workers’
compensation. The court’s dismissal in these circumstances does not bar
the employee from subsequently seeking workers’ compensation,
because such relief was not available in the first forum.62
The fourth limitation is of paramount importance in many land use
cases: a judgment does not bar a claim arising from facts that occur after
the judgment is rendered.63 Suppose, for example, that pursuant to a
judgment of divorce, a court awards custody to the child’s mother,
rejecting the father’s claim that the mother is unsuitable. If the mother
later engages in behavior that makes her unsuitable, the prior award
does not bar the court from awarding custody to the father.64
59. See Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 106, 110–11 (1991).
The Court relied on a statute tying the time for filing federal court claims to the date of filing a
prior claim with a state agency. Id. at 111 (citations omitted). The Court read the statute to
express a Congressional intention that plaintiffs be afforded a forum in federal court even after
an unsuccessful proceeding before a state agency. Id.
60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 20(1)(b).
61. Id. § 26(1)(c); see also id. § 26 cmt. c.
62. The same issue would arise in the land use context if a zoning board were confronted
with a variance application from a landowner whose site plan had been rejected by a planning
board for failure to comply with the zoning ordinance. Because the planning board lacked
authority to grant a variance, the planning board’s determination would not preclude the zoning
board from considering a variance application.
63. Id. § 24 cmt. f (“Material operative facts occurring after the decision of an action with
respect to the same subject matter may in themselves, or taken in conjunction with the
antecedent facts, comprise a transaction which may be made the basis of a second action not
precluded by the first.”).
64. Id. § 24 cmt. f, illus. 11.
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III. PRECLUSION DOCTRINE IN LAND USE CASES
Preclusion doctrine presents a difficult fit in zoning and land use
cases. On the one hand, finality is an important value in land use law, as
it is in other areas of law. Without some form of preclusion,
neighborhood residents and zoning boards face the prospect of devoting
resources to duplicative applications by persistent landowners. On the
other hand, facts relevant to a variance or special permit decision may
change—sometimes significantly—with the passage of time. Strict
application of preclusion doctrines threatens to freeze the use of land
over time, despite changes in market conditions and neighborhood
character.
Many courts deal with this conflict by indicating that a zoning
determination is entitled to res judicata effect unless circumstances have
changed since the determination was made.65 That formulation,
however, is not helpful in understanding the doctrine because
circumstances have always changed. The passage of time inevitably
brings changes, some more perceptible than others. If these judicial
pronouncements were taken literally, res judicata principles would be
irrelevant in all zoning cases.
Most courts do not, however, conclude that any change in
circumstances prevents application of preclusion doctrine, nor do they
conduct independent examinations to determine whether the changes
have been significant. Instead, most courts, as a matter of practice,
conclude that conditions have changed if—and only if—the zoning
board decides they have changed.66 As a result, the zoning board is
nearly always successful when it invokes preclusion doctrine in a land
use dispute. Conversely, preclusion claims advanced by neighbors and
landowners almost inevitably fail.67
At first glance, this result appears somewhat perverse and
inconsistent with traditional preclusion doctrine, which generally holds
65. See, e.g., Bentley v. Valco, Inc., 741 P.2d 1266, 1268 (Colo. App. 1987) (“A zoning
authority can reverse itself if there has been a substantial change in the facts or circumstances
subsequent to the earlier hearing . . . .”).
66. Sometimes courts make this point explicitly. In an early New Jersey Supreme Court
case, the court held that whether the changed conditions “requirement has been met is for the
board, in the first instance, to determine. This finding, as any other made by the board, will be
overturned on review only if it is shown to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious.” Russell v.
Bd. of Adjustment, 155 A.2d 83, 88 (N.J. 1959) (citations omitted); see also Freeman v. Town
of Ithaca Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 403 N.Y.S.2d 142, 143 (App. Div. 1978) (“[I]t is for the board
to determine whether or not changed facts or circumstances are presented . . . .”).
67. A narrow exception applies when the board refuses to consider whether conditions
have changed. Compare Marks v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 203 A.2d 761, 763 (R.I. 1964)
(invalidating grant of variance, but noting that whether change of conditions has occurred “is, in
the first instance, for the board to determine”), with Marks v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 232 A.2d
382, 383–84 (R.I. 1967) (quashing a grant of variance to same landowner despite the board’s
determination that, based on the evidence, circumstances had changed).
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all parties equally bound by the result of a prior proceeding. Properly
understood, however, prevailing judicial practice is quite consistent
with preclusion principles. Claim preclusion doctrine does not bar
subsequent claims when the earlier tribunal did not consider, and could
not have considered, the impact of post-determination occurrences.68
Issue preclusion doctrine, however, makes the first determination
binding with respect to all issues actually and necessarily determined by
the first tribunal.69 That is, the initial decision finally determines that the
landowner was, or was not, entitled to a variance or a permit as the facts
existed at the time of the application. At the time of the initial decision,
however, the board cannot determine if facts will subsequently arise that
will make the decision obsolete.
Whether circumstances have changed since the zoning board’s
initial decision is not a matter for a subsequent court to decide de novo.
Instead, on that issue, as on other fact issues in zoning cases, courts can
and should defer to the determination of the zoning board. As a result,
when a zoning board invokes res judicata to refuse to hear a subsequent
application by a landowner or a neighbor, a combination of issue
preclusion doctrine and principles of deference to administrative
determinations dictates judicial affirmance of the administrative
determination. By contrast, when a board seeks to revisit a prior
determination over the objection of a landowner or neighbor, preclusion
doctrine does not stand in the way. Even though the prior decision was
entitled to issue preclusion effect, the board’s subsequent decision that
circumstances have changed since the initial determination overcomes
the effect of preclusion.
This Part explores the various fact situations in which preclusion
claims arise, demonstrating in each case that, with narrow exceptions,
claim preclusion doctrine is and should be irrelevant, and that courts
consistently (if somewhat inartfully) serve finality interests by
combining issue preclusion doctrine with principles of deference to
local zoning board determinations.
A. Preclusion Claims by Applicant Landowners
Landowners applying for variances, special permits, or other
administrative relief rarely have occasion to invoke preclusion doctrine.
In some ways, a landowner–applicant resembles a plaintiff in ordinary
civil litigation. If a civil plaintiff brings an action and loses, preclusion
doctrine is of no use to the plaintiff. If the plaintiff wins, and the
68. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 cmt. f (“Material operative facts
occurring after the decision of an action with respect to the same subject matter may in
themselves, or taken in conjunction with the antecedent facts, comprise a transaction which may
be made the basis of a second action not precluded by the first.”).
69. Id. § 27.
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defendant immediately pays, the plaintiff also has no reason to rely on
preclusion doctrine.70 Thus, preclusion doctrine is only useful to the
plaintiff as a means of obtaining relief from a recalcitrant defendant.71
Similarly, if a zoning board denies the landowner’s initial application,
the landowner has no reason to invoke preclusion principles. And if the
zoning board grants the landowner’s application, the landowner has no
need to invoke preclusion principles; grant of the variance allows the
landowner to develop in accordance with the application. Nevertheless,
three situations arise in which landowner–applicants invoke preclusion
doctrine.
1. Time-Limited Variances and Special Permits
To take into account the possibility of changed circumstances,
some state statutes72 and many local ordinances73 limit the duration of
variances and special permits; if a landowner does not act on the
approval within a specified period of time, the approval expires, and the
landowner must reapply. Even when the ordinance itself does not limit
the duration of variances or special permits, the zoning board, when
approving an application, may impose conditions on the grant. For
example, the board might require the landowner to start (or complete)
construction by a particular date, or to reapply after a certain time
period even if construction is complete. When the landowner reapplies
with an identical application and is rejected, may the landowner invoke
res judicata principles to object to the board’s denial of the subsequent
application?
In this situation, the landowner’s preclusion claim should not, and
generally does not, succeed. 8131 Roosevelt Corp. v. Zoning Board of
Adjustment74 illustrates the problem. The zoning board initially granted
70. In fact, preclusion doctrine may be of more value to the losing defendant, because it
bars the plaintiff from seeking additional relief. See id. § 18 cmt. b.
71. See id. § 18 cmt. c (noting the value of preclusion doctrine in assisting plaintiffs
seeking to execute on a judgment); see also id. § 18 cmt. d (discussing the value of preclusion,
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, in obtaining enforcement in sister states).
72. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40A, § 10 (West 2010) (limiting duration of
variances to one year).
73. See, e.g., Twigg v. Town of Kennebunk, 662 A.2d 914, 915 (Me. 1995) (discussing a
local ordinance that provides for expiration of variance within six months if construction has not
begun); Omnivest v. Stewartstown Borough Zoning Hearing Bd., 641 A.2d 648, 649 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1994) (discussing a local ordinance that provides for expiration of variance when a
successful applicant does not obtain a building permit or use certificate within six months).
74. 794 A.2d 963 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002). Similarly, in Twigg, a prior landowner was
granted two identical area variances to build a single-family dwelling, both of which expired
due to his failure to record the variances and begin construction within the required time. 662
A.2d at 915. The subsequent landowner purchased the property in a foreclosure sale and applied
for an identical variance after the prior variance expired one month into his ownership. Id. The
board denied his application, finding that the landowner failed to prove that the land could not
yield a reasonable return without the variance, even though the board necessarily determined
this issue in the affirmative in the first two applications. See id. Nevertheless, the Supreme
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the landowner a two-year variance to use his property as an adult
cabaret. When the variance expired, the board denied an application for
an identical variance,75 concluding that the landowner had not proven
lack of adverse impact on the neighborhood, despite the board’s
contrary determination in the first application.76 The board relied in part
on complaints by abutting neighbors.77 In upholding the board’s
determination, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania rejected the
landowner’s claim that res judicata bound the board to its previous
decision.78 The court reiterated that the grant of a temporary variance
did not purport to determine whether the elements of a variance had
been met permanently; rather, each determination was limited to the
specific two-year period and was subject to re-evaluation upon
reapplication.79
By limiting the initial variance to a two-year period, the zoning
board in 8131 Roosevelt essentially signaled that it was reserving
judgment on whether a variance would be appropriate in the future. The
situation is the same where a prior adjudication expressly authorizes
splitting of a claim. In that scenario, claim preclusion doctrine does not
extinguish the portion of the claim reserved for future decision.80
Similarly, claim preclusion doctrine always yields to a legislative
determination that the doctrine should not apply. In each of these
instances, the rationales for the doctrine are inapplicable. An
authoritative decisionmaker—either the prior court or the legislature—
has determined that the facts and issues before the second
decisionmaker will be sufficiently different to permit a new evaluation
of the parties’ claims.81 The second tribunal will not, therefore, be
Judicial Court of Maine not only declined to apply claim preclusion to the reconsideration of the
application, but also failed to apply issue preclusion to the “reasonable return” determination
that the only beneficial use of the land was for residential purposes. See id. at 918–19.
75. 8131 Roosevelt, 794 A.2d at 965. The property previously had been used as a go-go
dance club. Id.
76. Id. at 965–66.
77. Id. at 966. The board also determined that the landowner did not prove unnecessary
hardship, but did not further elaborate on that finding. Id.
78. Id. at 969. Arguably, the ability of the zoning board to reconsider the variance
application was more explicable in 8131 Roosevelt, in which the variance was unambiguously
temporary, see id. at 969, than in Omnivest, where the validity of the variance could be affected
only by a failure to record or begin construction within a given time period. See 641 A.2d at
649. In both instances, however, the court deferred to the board’s determination to reconsider
the application.
79. 8131 Roosevelt, 794 A.2d at 969; see also Twigg, 662 A.2d at 915; Maurice Callahan
& Sons, Inc. v. Bd. of Appeals, 565 N.E.2d 813, 815–16 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991); Lopes v. Bd. of
Appeals, 543 N.E.2d 421, 422 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989); Hunters Brook Realty Corp. v. Zoning
Bd. of Appeals, 436 N.E.2d 978, 983–84 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982); Citrus Trust v. Bd. of Zoning
Appeals, No. 54231, 1989 WL 4130, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 19, 1989); Omnivest, 641 A.2d at
652.
80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26(1)(b) (1982); see also id. § 26 cmt. b.
81. See Lopes, 543 N.E.2d at 422 (construing a Massachusetts statute that provided for
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duplicating the work of the first. Moreover, when the facts before the
second tribunal are different, that tribunal does not disrespect the work
of its predecessor when it reaches a different conclusion.
The zoning board in 8131 Roosevelt, by placing time limits on the
grant of the variance, explicitly permitted, and even required, that the
landowner’s claim be split into separate pieces—the board determined
the first piece, whether a time-limited variance should be issued, and
reserved the rest for future decision. Because claim preclusion doctrine
is inapplicable, the grant of the time-limited variance does not preclude
the landowner from seeking a subsequent identical variance upon
expiration of the first. On the other hand, it also does not preclude the
board from denying the new variance or permit application.
In contrast, the temporary nature of a variance will not necessarily
prevent the operation of issue preclusion doctrine. While a board can
reasonably decide that circumstances might change over the ensuing
two years, reserving for itself the power to make a different decision
that takes into account facts that subsequently unfold, a board cannot
reasonably decide that its decision would be different two years hence
on precisely the same facts. As a result, the board’s current decision will
bind the board in the future so long as the facts do not change.82 If, for
instance, grant of a variance requires the board to make a finding that
the land is no longer suitable for permitted uses within the district, issue
preclusion doctrine would require a subsequent board to adhere to that
determination in the absence of evidence of changed circumstances.83
But issue preclusion doctrine does not prevent a subsequent zoning
board from denying a variance based on circumstances not before the
earlier board. As discussed above, courts typically defer to board
determinations as to whether facts have materially changed since its
earlier decision. Thus, in 8131 Roosevelt, the court upheld the zoning
board’s determination that the neighbors’ experience with the cabaret
lapse of variance after one year and noting that “[t]he application of claim or issue preclusion
principles in the event of a lapsed variance would undermine the purpose of the lapse provision:
to force the applicant to justify the variance he seeks unassisted by the earlier proceedings”);
Hunters Brook Realty Corp., 436 N.E.2d at 983–84 (invoking the same statute to reject
preclusion argument).
82. Whether the board should be free to depart from its initial determination based on
newly discovered facts, that is, facts in existence at the time of that determination but not
brought to the board’s attention, remains an open question. Courts typically defer to board
decisions characterizing newly discovered evidence as changed circumstances. See infra
Subsection III.C.3.
83. Cf. Stop & Shop Supermarket Co. v. Bd. of Adjustment, 744 A.2d 1169, 1179–80
(N.J. 2000) (holding that the board could not contradict its earlier findings that residential
development of a residentially-zoned portion of the property was inappropriate; the court’s
ultimate holding was that a supermarket chain did not need a new variance because its operation
was covered by a prior variance granted to permit use of residentially-zoned land by a luxury
department store).
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was a relevant factor that was not before the board when it approved the
initial variance.
In sum, neither claim preclusion doctrine nor issue preclusion
doctrine requires a zoning board to grant a variance merely because the
board had previously granted a time-limited variance to the same
landowner. Issue preclusion doctrine may limit the board’s power to
reconsider discrete issues, but in light of the deference courts typically
accord to board determinations, the limits imposed by issue preclusion
doctrine rarely will operate as a significant constraint.
2. Variances and Special Permits Not Subject to
Time Limitations
Although the practice of placing time limits on variances and
special permits has become common, it is not universal. When a
landowner applies for a variance or special permit, and a zoning board
approves the application without imposing any time constraints, it is
reasonable to infer that the landowner will rely on the grant in a tangible
way. Once the landowner starts to develop the land in reliance on the
variance, vested-rights doctrine prevents the municipality from revoking
the variance.84 But even if the landowner has not yet started
development, most ordinances confer no power on the zoning board to
undo a variance or special permit once granted. As a result, the
landowner will not have to rely on preclusion doctrine.
Tohr Industries v. Zoning Board of Appeals85 is illustrative. The
landowner’s predecessor had obtained a variance in 1954 to construct a
building for business use in a residential district. More than thirty years
later, when the landowner sought to build a retail store on the site, the
building commissioner objected and, on the commissioner’s petition,
the zoning board revoked the variance. The New York Court of
Appeals, however, reinstated the variance, observing that the prior
board had not imposed any conditions on the variance, and concluding
that the local ordinance did not confer power on the board to revoke a
variance unless the landowner breached or violated a condition the
board had previously imposed.
3. Collateral Consequences of Determinations
Favorable to the Landowner
Because a zoning board rarely has power to revoke a variance once
granted, courts do not have to face a straightforward claim preclusion
problem where the board faces two successive claims of entitlement to a
84. For a general discussion of the vested rights doctrine, see Brian K. Steinwascher,
Note, Statutory Development Rights: Why Implementing Vested Rights Through Statute Serves
the Interests of the Developer and Government Alike, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 265, 275–77 (2010).
85. 549 N.E.2d 142 (N.Y. 1989).
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variance.86 Instead, preclusion claims typically revolve around the effect
of an earlier resolution of a discrete legal issue that would be
determinative in a subsequent application. In this situation, courts apply
issue preclusion principles and bind the board to its earlier
determination—but only if prior resolution of the disputed issue leaves
no discretion for the subsequent board.
For instance, if neighbors challenge a determination that a building
permit was properly issued, and the zoning board dismisses the
challenge as untimely, the same board cannot later entertain a challenge
to a certificate of occupancy subsequently issued for the use authorized
by the building permit.87 Or, if in a referral to determine whether a
landowner’s lots comply with the zoning ordinance, the zoning board
interprets the ordinance to permit the landowner to include street beds in
calculating the size of individual lots (obviating the need for an area
variance), the board cannot later reject the landowner’s application that
the street beds be included in calculating the total area of his lots for
subdivision purposes.88 In each case, the board’s determination of a
contested legal issue becomes binding on the board even if the context
of the claim is somewhat different.
B. Preclusion Claims by Neighbors
In an ordinary civil action for negligence or breach of contract, the
defendant must appear in court to protect her interest. Appearance
requires the expenditure of time and money (often including fees for
legal representation). If the defendant proves successful in the litigation,
claim preclusion doctrine protects the defendant against the possibility
that the plaintiff will try again.
86. On its face, Barber v. Weber, 715 N.W.2d 683 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006), presents the
most analogous situation. After landowners sought a determination that the zoning ordinance
permitted their proposed use of the property, thus obviating the need for a conditional-use
permit, the neighbors sought no judicial review. Id. at 685. Instead, three months after
landowners began construction, the neighbors filed a separate action for an adjudication that the
proposed use of the property violated the zoning ordinance. Id. The neighbors did not make the
zoning board a party to the litigation. See id. The court dismissed their claim, relying on claim
preclusion doctrine. Id. at 689. Barber is not, however, a case that pitted the landowners against
the zoning board; it is clear that the zoning board would have supported the landowners’
position. As a practical matter, therefore, the case resembles those discussed infra in Section
III.C, in which the board invokes preclusion principles.
87. See Palm Mgmt. Corp. v. Goldstein, 815 N.Y.S.2d 670, 674 (App. Div. 2006).
Although the court in Palm Management used claim preclusion language, the challenge to the
certificate of occupancy could not have been raised in the prior proceeding, because the
certificate had not yet been issued at that time. The second challenge does not, therefore, fit
neatly into the claim preclusion category. Moreover, it is not at all clear that the court would
have reached the same result if the earlier board had dismissed the challenge to the building
permit without considering the timeliness of the first challenge. Issue preclusion, by contrast,
prevented the board from raising a ground—timeliness—that explicitly had been foreclosed by
its decision in the prior proceeding.
88. See Waylonis v. Baum, 723 N.Y.S.2d 55, 57 (App. Div. 2001).
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In many ways, the neighbors who oppose a landowner’s application
for a variance or special permit resemble the defendant in civil
litigation. The forum is different (a zoning board rather than a court of
general jurisdiction), and the format of the proceedings may be
different,89 but the neighbors’ objectives and options are similar to those
of the defendant: in order to protect their interests, they must spend time
and energy defending their position. One might expect, therefore, that if
the neighbors prevail before the board, preclusion doctrine would
protect them against subsequent variance and special permit
applications by the same landowner.
For a variety of reasons, claim preclusion doctrine does not—and
should not—provide significant protection to neighbors. First,
permitting a zoning board to consider a second application, even after a
prior denial, has more potential to generate efficiency gains than
typically will be the case in ordinary civil litigation. Second, it would
cripple the decisionmaking process in land use cases to require a
plaintiff to raise all legal theories and requests for relief in a single
proceeding. Third, because a landowner unhappy with a board decision
always can seek legislative relief in the form of a zoning amendment,
the reliance interest of victorious neighbors is not nearly as strong as it
would be in ordinary civil litigation. This Section explores these
problems and demonstrates how they have led courts to reject claim
preclusion arguments advanced by neighbors.
1. The Probability and Promise of Improved Decisionmaking
Consider ordinary civil litigation—for instance, a claim for breach
of contract or for wrongful death. If the plaintiff brings an action against
the defendant and loses after a jury trial, why should the plaintiff be
precluded from suing again, using the evidence the plaintiff gathered
during the first action? The answer starts with litigation cost, both to
decisionmakers and to the winning parties. Of course, permitting any
litigation entails some cost, and we do not preclude a party from
bringing a first action, because a judicial resolution generates social
benefits that would be unavailable if the court refused to entertain the
initial dispute. However, a cost-benefit analysis yields a much different
result for a second, duplicative action: the costs associated with
subsequent suits generate marginal, if any, likelihood of achieving
“better” results.90 Because wrongful death and breach of contract are
claims in which the merits are based on past events, all of the relevant
89. Zoning boards typically are authorized to establish their own procedural guidelines for
application hearings as to, inter alia, the presentment of evidence, use of expert witnesses, and
presence of a stenographer. 23 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 5 (1993).
90. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS ch. 1, at 10 (1982) (“[F]inality attaches
not because the courts are infallible but because they are inevitably fallible.”).
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facts are at least theoretically available at the time of the first litigation.
In time, lawyers and parties may uncover more information about the
circumstances of the wrongful death or the contract breach, but the
tendency of evidence at the first trial to degrade over time serves as a
counterweight to the benefits of newly discovered evidence. Moreover,
if the prospect of newly discovered evidence supports a second trial,
why not a third? Logic provides no evident stopping point.
The initial decision in a wrongful death action or a breach of
contract action has serious consequences for both the plaintiff and the
defendant: the winning party will be significantly better off than the
losing party. But so long as the system provides each party with a fair
opportunity to present its case, the social consequences of the decision
are less clear. Although putting money in the plaintiff’s pocket will
undoubtedly generate external effects different from those that would
arise if the money stayed in the defendant’s pocket, there is no a priori
reason to believe that one decision rather than the other will generate
significant efficiency gains.
There are, of course, exceptions to these general propositions.
Sometimes, facts that arise after a tribunal renders its initial judgment
will improve significantly the quality of an ultimate decision. And
sometimes, the effects of a judgment are not merely distributional.
Child custody cases illustrate both propositions. A custodial parent’s
neglect after a court has rendered an initial custody determination sheds
considerable light on the wisdom of the determination. The effects of
the custody determination will be felt not only by the child, but also
potentially by society at large. It should not be surprising, then, that
claim preclusion doctrine does not prevent a court from revisiting
custody determinations based on facts that arise after the initial custody
determination.91
With that background, consider a variance or special permit denial
by a zoning board. The passage of time generates more information
about the effect that new construction will have on the existing
neighborhood. Suppose, for instance, that after the zoning board denied
a use variance to permit multifamily construction, the local legislative
body rezoned land in an abutting single-family district to permit
multifamily construction. The rezoning might affect the returns the
landowner would be able to obtain by building single-family homes and
might also reduce the external effect of multifamily construction on
neighboring sites. Applying claim preclusion doctrine to bar the
landowner from seeking a new variance would freeze the parcel into a

91. See, e.g., Lynch v. Horton, 692 S.E.2d 34, 37, 39 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that
mother’s forgery of a court order justified trial court in shifting custody from mother, who had
prevailed in earlier custody determination, to father).
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use that could well become inefficient.92 It should not be surprising,
therefore, that courts seize upon changed circumstances like these in
rejecting claim preclusion arguments advanced by neighbors.93
2. Efficient Claim Presentation
Claim preclusion doctrine prevents plaintiffs from splitting claims
and raising them in separate proceedings.94 Suppose the defendant
borrows the plaintiff’s car, promising to return it. If the defendant fails
to return the car, the plaintiff might be able to proceed against the
defendant on multiple theories (conversion and breach of contract), and
might be entitled to more than one remedy (money damages or
injunctive relief).95 But if the plaintiff brings one action and loses, she
cannot then bring another action advancing a different theory or seeking
a different relief.96 The assumption behind these rules is that
adjudication will generate better results, while imposing fewer burdens
on parties and decisionmakers, if all potential remedies and theories for
recovery are explored in a single proceeding. With land use
applications, however, the efficiency calculus is somewhat different.
a. No Preclusion of Different Applications
If the prohibition on splitting of claims were applied in the context
of zoning and land use, a landowner seeking to develop a parcel of land
would have to request from a zoning board all of the alternative forms
of relief the landowner might want, and all of the theories for obtaining
that relief within the board’s authoritative power. If the landowner
omitted a theory or a remedy, claim preclusion doctrine would bar the
landowner from seeking that remedy later. For instance, if a landowner
sought a variance from setback requirements to permit construction of a
residence, and the zoning board denied the variance, the landowner
would be precluded from subsequently seeking a smaller variance from
92. Cf. Springsteel v. Town of W. Orange, 373 A.2d 415, 418 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1977) (“To hold differently would offend public policy by countenancing a restraint upon the
future exercise of municipal action in the absence of sound reason . . . .”).
93. See, e.g., Laurel Beach Ass’n v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 785 A.2d 1169, 1177 (Conn.
App. Ct. 2001) (holding that a material change in zoning regulations prevents application of res
judicata doctrine to bar subsequent application); Filanowski v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 266
A.2d 670, 672 (Pa. 1970) (holding that a prior variance denial does not bind zoning board where
rezoning neighboring land to permit apartments created new hardship to landowner).
94. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 24–25.
95. See id. § 24 cmt. b, illus. 3 & § 25 cmt. f (noting that parties may not bring successive
actions for different remedies arising out of same transaction or connected series of
transactions).
96. Id. § 24 cmt. c (“That a number of different legal theories casting liability on an actor
may apply to a given episode does not create multiple transactions and hence multiple claims.
This remains true although the several legal theories depend on different shadings of the
facts, . . . or would call for different measures of liability or different kinds of relief.”).
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the same setback requirements, because the landowner could have
presented both requests in the same proceeding.
Thus, in the zoning context, unlike the civil litigation context, a
prohibition on splitting of claims would lead to inefficient
decisionmaking. A landowner might be willing to build one of a dozen
homes, each of which would require a variance, but the landowner has
no intention of building all twelve. A rule prohibiting seriatim
applications would require the landowner to present, and the board to
evaluate, twelve separate plans, even though the landowner would never
develop more than one.97 Moreover, the rule would stifle the give-andtake that often accompanies a board’s denial of relief; the public hearing
process often educates the landowner about community and zoning
board objections and enables the landowner to present a new application
that better accommodates those concerns.98
When a litigant seeking relief cannot join claims in a single
proceeding, ordinary claim preclusion policies do not apply. The
comments to section 24 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments99
97. The forms provided by municipalities to zoning applicants rarely give applicants the
option to present alternative proposals. Applicants merely fill out the blank spaces on a form
designed to describe a single zoning request. For example, a zoning application in Barnstable,
Massachusetts provides in relevant part:
Existing Level of Development of the Property - Number of Buildings: _________
Present Use(s): ________________________ Gross Floor Area: _____sq. ft.
Proposed Gross Floor Area to be Added: ____ sq. ft., Altered: ____ sq. ft.
Application for a Variance, TOWN OF BARNSTABLE, 2, http://www.town.barnstable.ma.us/
ZoningBoard/ZBA%20Variance%20Application.pdf (last visited May 12, 2011).
Similarly, a zoning application in West Hempfield Township, Lancaster, Pennsylvania
provides in relevant part:
Proposed use and/or structures_______
Yards proposed: Front ______ ft. Rear _____ ft. Side _____ ft.
Lot area ______ acres/sq. ft. Impervious coverage proposed______%
Proposed structure: Width_____ Depth______ Height______
Zoning Permit Application, WEST HEMPFIELD TWP., 1, http://www.twp.west-hempfield.pa.us/
westhempfield/lib/westhempfield/zoning_application.pdf (last visited May 12, 2011).
In addition, if landowners were required to present all plans at once and each plan were
deemed a separate application, landowners might be required to pay multiple fees, which are not
inconsiderable. For example, in Wayland, Massachusetts, the residential application fee is $150
and the non-residential fee is $225. Zoning Board of Appeals Checklist, TOWN OF WAYLAND, 2,
http://www.wayland.ma.us/Pages/WaylandMA_ZBA/ZONINGCHECKLSTrev.pdf (last visited
May 12, 2011). In Cheshire, Connecticut, the residential application fee is $175 and the
nonresidential fee is $300. Planning & Zoning Application Fee Schedule, TOWN OF CHESHIRE,
http://www.cheshirect.org/planningzoning/pzapplicationfees.html (last visited May 12, 2011).
98. See Daniel P. Selmi, Reconsidering the Use of Direct Democracy in Making Land Use
Decisions, 19 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 293, 319 (2001/2002) (noting that public hearings
generate a “‘give and take’ of ideas among interested parties [and] the ability to float
compromise proposals”).
99. Section 24 provides, in relevant part, “[T]he claim extinguished includes all rights of
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explain that equating “claim” with “transaction” is justified only when
the litigants have sufficient procedural means by which to fully develop
the claim in one action without being confined to a single type of
relief.100 The modern judicial system provides such means: federal and
state rules of civil procedure specifically state that a litigant may request
different types of relief in one pleading.101 Zoning processes, which
limit landowners to one type of relief per application, do not.
Courts universally recognize this problem, but they do so implicitly.
Typically, courts pay homage to the principle that res judicata doctrine
applies to zoning determinations, but then carve out an exception for
changed applications—an exception that could easily swallow the rule.
The result is that neighbors may not rely on claim preclusion doctrine to
prevent a zoning board from hearing a separate application for
development on the same parcel. Hilltop Terrace Homeowner’s Ass’n v.
Island County102 is illustrative. Seven months after the board of county
commissioners denied a conditional-use permit to a cell phone provider
seeking to build a tower in a rural residential zone, the board approved a
new proposal for the same site, concluding that it was not bound by res
judicata principles.103 In rejecting the neighbors’ challenge to the
approval, the Washington Supreme Court agreed with the board,
emphasizing that the second application “substituted a fundamentally
different kind of structure, completely rerouted the access road to the
site, significantly increased setbacks, and changed the number and kind
of antennae.”104 Although the court indicated that res judicata principles
apply to zoning applications, the court’s conclusion that “a second
application may be considered if there is a substantial change in
circumstances or conditions relevant to the application or a substantial
change in the application itself”105 undermines its argument that claim
preclusion principles apply. After all, in Hilltop Terrace itself, both
proposals were for cell phone towers, and every feature of the approved
application could have been placed before the board at the time of the
the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the
transaction . . . out of which the action arose.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24(1)
(emphasis added).
100. Id. § 24 cmt. a (“A modern procedural system does furnish such means. It permits the
presentation in the action of all material relevant to the transaction without artificial
confinement to any single substantive theory or kind of relief and without regard to historical
forms of action or distinctions between law and equity.”).
101. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(3) (stating that a pleading must contain “a demand for the relief
sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief”). States have
adopted similar wording in their pleading rules. See, e.g., MASS. R. CIV. P. 8(a) (“Relief in the
alternative or of several different types may be demanded.”); ME. R. CIV. P. 8(a) (same); OHIO
R. CIV. P. 8(a) (same).
102. 891 P.2d 29 (Wash. 1995).
103. Id. at 33.
104. Id. at 35.
105. Id.
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first application.
Similarly, in Gunn v. Board of County Commissioners,106 a zoning
board denied a landowner’s initial application to construct a softball
field on premises operated as a private country club.107 The landowner
submitted a second application two years later, having interchanged the
proposed locations for home plate and the outfield.108 The zoning board
granted a special permit, stating that the change reduced the noise and
inconvenience to the neighboring homes.109 The Third District Court of
Appeal of Florida rejected the neighbor’s claim of res judicata and held
that the zoning ruling two years prior was not binding where a
substantial change of circumstances occurred between the two
applications.110 The court went on to explain that the authority to decide
whether such a change had taken place “lies primarily within the
discretion of the zoning authority itself,”111 and that by granting the
second application, the board implicitly concluded that the repositioning
of the field was a “meaningful alteration” of the previously rejected
proposal.112
As a Massachusetts appeals court recognized in Ranney v. Board of
Appeals,113 giving a local permit-granting authority flexibility to
consider multiple applications “offers the possibility of land use
solutions sufficiently acceptable to the contending parties to keep the
matter out of the courts.”114 That is, the developer may learn from a
previous denial of a variance or special permit and develop a plan more
acceptable to neighbors. The application of claim preclusion doctrine
would foreclose that option.
Courts have not ignored finality considerations in rejecting
neighbors’ arguments that claim preclusion doctrine bars a landowner’s
second application where the board denied the same landowner’s initial
application. Rather, courts have often concluded that those concerns can
106. 481 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
107. Id. at 96.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. (citing Coral Reef Nurseries, Inc. v. Babcock Co., 410 So. 2d 648, 651–54 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1982)).
111. Id. (citing City of Miami Beach v. Prevatt, 97 So. 2d 473, 477 (Fla. 1957)).
112. Id. Other cases concluding that neighbors may not invoke res judicata doctrine to
overturn a board’s grant of an application significantly different from a previously denied
application include Rocchi v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 248 A.2d 922, 925 (Conn. 1968)
(special exception applications), Hunt v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 812 N.Y.S.2d 581, 582
(App. Div. 2006) (variance applications), Riina v. Baum, 754 N.Y.S.2d 644, 645 (App. Div.
2002) (same), Peterson v. City Council, 574 P.2d 326, 331 (Or. Ct. App. 1978) (same), and
Wolfe v. Forbes, 217 S.E.2d 899, 902 (W. Va. 1975) (same). Cf. Anderson v. Bd. of Cnty.
Comm’rs, 217 P.3d 401, 408 (Wyo. 2009) (upholding grant of permit after previous denial
without discussing res judicata or claim preclusion doctrine).
113. 414 N.E.2d 373 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981).
114. Id. at 376. The court noted, tongue-in-cheek, that “[t]he instant case illustrates that this
advantage may be more theoretical than real.” Id.
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best be addressed by deference to the zoning board; if the board decides
the new application is sufficiently different to warrant reconsideration,
the court should not second-guess that decision. As the New Jersey
Supreme Court explained in sustaining the board’s decision to grant a
variance after a previous denial of a somewhat different variance, “the
question is not whether a reviewing court would have reached a
different conclusion if it had initially decided the matter, but whether
the Planning Board was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable in
concluding that [the] second application was sufficiently different to
justify considering it on the merits.”115
b. No Preclusion of the Same Application when
Applicant Produces New Information
A fundamental concept of claim preclusion doctrine is that a court
cannot rehear a claim simply because it incorrectly decided the initial
action.116 Claim preclusion doctrine operates on the premise that, when
faced with the same information, there is little reason to assume that a
second decisionmaker will reach a better conclusion than the first. But
suppose one or both of the parties offers more information to the second
decisionmaker—that premise would no longer hold. Nevertheless, even
if a litigant explains that the first determination was in error due to a
litigant’s failure to fully educate the court about the important facts of
the case, claim preclusion instructs that all related arguments, issues and
evidence that could have been raised at the time of the initial claim are
thereafter relinquished.117
115. Bressman v. Gash, 621 A.2d 476, 481 (N.J. 1993) (citation omitted) (relying on its
prior decision in Russell v. Board of Adjustment, 155 A.2d 83 (N.J. 1959)). For other cases
holding that neighbors may not invoke res judicata or claim preclusion principles based on
deference to a board’s determination that the previous and subsequent applications were
materially different, see Ranney, 414 N.E.2d at 376 (citing Rocchi v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals,
248 A.2d 922, 925 (1968)) (“Whether the plans . . . have changed sufficiently to justify a
reapplication . . . is principally for the local board to determine.”), Freeman v. Town of Ithaca
Zoning Board of Appeals, 403 N.Y.S.2d 142, 143 (App. Div. 1978) (quoting Ellsworth Realty
Co. v. Kramer, 49 N.Y.S.2d 512, 513 (App. Div. 1944)) (“[I]t is for the board to determine
whether or not changed facts or circumstances are presented and, in so doing, it may give weight
even ‘to slight differences which are not easily discernible.’”), and Fiorilla v. Zoning Board of
Appeals, 129 A.2d 619, 621 (Conn. 1957).
116. See Bressman, 621 A.2d at 481; see also Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452
U.S. 394, 398 (1981) (citations omitted) (“Nor are the res judicata consequences of a final,
unappealed judgment on the merits altered by the fact that the judgment may have been wrong
or rested on a legal principle subsequently overruled in another case.”); Bath Iron Works Corp.
v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 125 F.3d 18, 22 (1st Cir. 1997) (“But the point of
[res judicata] is that the first determination is binding not because it is right but because it is
first—and was reached after a full and fair opportunity between the parties to litigate the
issue.”).
117. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24(1) (1982) (“When a valid and final
judgment rendered in an action extinguishes the plaintiff’s claim pursuant to the rules of merger
or bar . . . , the claim extinguished includes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the
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The prohibition on raising new arguments and evidence is based on
the perverse incentives a contrary rule would generate. If a party could
obtain reconsideration by offering new evidence, then each party would
have an incentive to withhold some evidence from the first proceeding,
hoping to prevail anyway but knowing that the withheld evidence could
help obtain a second chance at a favorable judgment. Precluding a
rehearing in such instances creates appropriate incentives to come
forward with all evidence and minimizes the chance a party will
“discover” new evidence between the first and second proceedings.
Although these same considerations are present in zoning and land
use cases, courts seem to directly contravene these principles. To avoid
the problem of “run[ning] afoul of the edicts of the doctrine of res
judicata,”118 the courts classify the landowner’s submission of new
evidence as a material change in circumstances, even if that evidence
could have been presented at the time of the first proceeding. Consider
Winchester v. W.A. Foote Memorial Hospital, Inc.119 The local zoning
ordinance permitted construction of a helicopter landing pad as an
accessory use to a hospital if the hospital obtained a conditional-use
permit. At the initial public hearing on the hospital’s permit application,
neighbors complained about noise and suggested alternative sites,
leading the planning commission to deny the permit. Two months later,
the commission granted the hospital’s second, virtually identical
application for a conditional-use permit. When neighbors challenged the
grant, the Michigan Court of Appeals rejected the challenge, holding
that the commission was justified in reversing its first decision. The
court noted that the initial rejection was based on the commission’s
conclusion that a better site was available, but that the hospital’s
introduction of additional evidence served to establish that there were,
in fact, no better sites.120
defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions,
out of which the action arose.”). Comment a to section 24 of the Restatement explains the
rationale for precluding claims which might have been litigated:
[Without such application], the plaintiff might be able to maintain another action
based on a different theory, even though both actions were grounded upon the
defendant’s identical act or connected acts forming a single life-situation. . . .
The present trend is to see claim in factual terms and to make it coterminous with
the transaction regardless of the number of substantive theories, or variant forms of
relief flowing from those theories, that may be available to the plaintiff . . . .
Id. § 24 cmt. a.
118. McDonald’s Corp. v. Twp. of Canton, 441 N.W.2d 37, 41 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).
119. 396 N.W.2d 456 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986).
120. Id. at 461; see also Vine v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 927 A.2d 958, 963–64 (Conn.
App. Ct. 2007) (citing Laurel Beach Ass’n v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 785 A.2d 1169, 1174–75
(Conn. App. Ct. 2001)) (holding that a board can reverse its decision based on information it did
not have upon denying initial application); Bradley v. Inland Wetlands Agency, 609 A.2d 1043,
1045 (Conn. App. Ct. 1992) (holding the same). Other courts have indicated in dictum that
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Perhaps the disparity between the treatment of new information in
zoning cases and in ordinary civil litigation is motivated by the
longterm inefficient use of land that would be generated by “erroneous”
decisions in zoning cases.121 Perhaps courts believe that zoning law
provides other mechanisms to incentivize landowners to bring forth all
pertinent information in the initial application. For instance, so long as
the zoning board has discretion to conclude that new information is not
significant enough to constitute a “material change in circumstances,”
and can refuse to consider it, parties will still have incentives to produce
all information upon the first application. And in some jurisdictions,
time limits on reapplication will create a disincentive for withholding
information.122 Whatever the reasons for the disparity, however, judicial
treatment of new information in zoning cases is inconsistent with the
tenets of claim preclusion doctrine.
3. The Availability of Legislative Relief and the
Reliance Interest of Neighbors
Preclusion doctrine rests in part on protecting the reliance interests
of parties who have invested time and energy in successfully litigating a
claim or defense. Neighbors who prevail before a zoning board could
advance the same reliance arguments. The problem with the reliance
argument in the zoning context is that no matter what happens before
the zoning board, the local legislature is almost always free to change
the ordinance to permit the landowner’s proposed use. Otherwise, a
emergence of new information would entitle a board to entertain a second application. See, e.g.,
Ranney v. Bd. of Appeals, 414 N.E.2d 373, 377 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981) (“To the extent that the
board thought itself in error about underlying assumptions concerning the proposal, this
constituted a change of circumstances which permitted the board to entertain a second
application for zoning relief.”); McDonald’s Corp., 441 N.W.2d at 40–41 (concluding that new
information submitted to the board in response to concerns expressed by the board in the
original denial constituted change of circumstances).
121. In Winchester, for instance, had the court determined that claim preclusion barred the
zoning board from reconsidering the hospital’s application, the zoning board’s error would have
perpetuated a long-lasting inefficiency in the hospital’s distance from and accessibility to an
offsite emergency helicopter launch pad. See 396 N.W.2d at 460–63.
122. See State ex rel. DeZeeuw v. Manitowoc Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment, No. 91-0914, 478
N.W.2d 596, 1991 WL 285894, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 1991) (unpublished table
decision) (per curiam) (citing local ordinance precluding applicant from bringing appeal to
board based on same facts for a period of one year after initial rejection). In Winchester, by
contrast, the Michigan court concluded that the local ordinance’s one-year bar on resubmission
does not apply when the applicant brings new information before the commission. 396 N.W.2d
at 460–62. Other courts have held that waiting periods like the one involved in Manitowoc and
Winchester do not bar reapplication when landowner makes changes to the application,
suggesting that the bar would apply when landowner brings the same application. See, e.g.,
Ranney, 414 N.E.2d at 376 (“It has always been supposed that if an application disclosed a
project materially different from the one first introduced,” the statutory bar would not apply);
Peterson v. City Council, 574 P.2d 326, 331 (Or. Ct. App. 1978) (concluding that when second
variance application was substantially different from prior application, ban on reapplication does
not apply).
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single administrative proceeding would forever prevent the municipality
from changing land use policy. As a result, the neighbors do not have
rights that “vest” once they prevail before the zoning board,
undermining any assertions of a reliance interest.123
A number of states impose judicial review on “legislative”
determinations to rezone land. A few require the legislature to establish
that the previous classification was a mistake or that there has been a
significant change in circumstances that warrants a new classification.
Others constrain the legislature by labeling the rezoning decision
“quasi-judicial” and therefore subject to constraints not ordinarily
imposed on legislative decisions. Even states that provide for judicial
review of rezoning decisions, however, give the local legislature broad
discretion to depart from its prior decisions. Consider Coral Reef
Nurseries, Inc. v. Babcock Co.124 A year and a half after denying the
landowner’s application to rezone its property to permit residential use,
the board of county commissioners approved a similar rezoning request.
Although Florida’s Third District Court of Appeal indicated that
administrative res judicata should apply to rezoning decisions, the court
rejected the neighbors’ contention that the doctrine precluded the
challenged rezoning. The court held that the applicability of res judicata
doctrine is primarily within the administrative body’s province, and its
determination “may only be overturned upon a showing of a complete
absence of any justification therefor.”125
4. Issue Preclusion
The preceding Subparts demonstrate that, despite judicial
pronouncements about the applicability of claim preclusion or res
judicata principles to zoning determinations, claim preclusion doctrine
provides neighbors with virtually no protection. Public policy sensibly
entitles zoning boards to consider changed applications and changed
circumstances, leaving claim preclusion doctrine as a toothless
constraint on zoning boards. We now turn briefly to issue preclusion
principles. Issue preclusion binds a decisionmaker to honor a prior
determination of an issue actually litigated and necessarily determined
in a prior proceeding. These limitations make it difficult for neighbors
to invoke issue preclusion doctrine.
To obtain a variance, a landowner generally must establish several
factors;126 the absence of any factor precludes grant of the variance. As
123. See Bentley v. Valco, Inc., 741 P.2d 1266, 1269 (Colo. App. 1987) (citations omitted)
(noting that authority of zoning board to reverse itself would be subject to vested rights
limitation, but holding that adjacent landowners cannot acquire vested rights).
124. 410 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
125. Id. at 655.
126. See, e.g., supra note 8.
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a result, an express finding that one of the factors is missing is rarely
necessary to the board’s determination, because the board’s denial could
rest on the absence of any one of the factors. Russell v. Board of
Adjustment127 exemplifies the problem. In denying the landowner a
variance, the board concluded that the landowner had failed to prove
that the variance could be granted without detriment to the public or
impairment of the zoning plan and ordinance. A court sustained the
board’s denial, also concluding that any hardship suffered by the
landowner was self-created. A month after the judicial decision, the
landowner applied for a new variance, and the neighbors contended that
issue preclusion bound the board to the determination that any hardship
was self-created.128 The New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the issue
preclusion defense on the ground that a finding of self-created hardship,
even if binding, would not in itself bar relief on a new application.129
Without deciding the issue, the court raised a more general question
of greater importance: if the decisionmaker in the first proceeding has
two or more grounds for a decision, is either ground binding in a
subsequent case presenting a different claim?130 The Restatement
(Second) of Judgments squarely answers that question: No.131 The
reasoning offered in the Restatement is particularly important in the
zoning setting: if each alternative ground were given issue preclusive
effect, the losing party would have incentives to appeal the
determination simply to protect himself against application of
preclusion doctrine.132 In the zoning context, in other words, application
of issue preclusion to a determination of “no hardship” would require a
landowner who might otherwise apply for a new and less significant
variance to first challenge the initial variance denial in court; failure to
do so would preclude any subsequent application. This concern about
encouraging litigation undoubtedly explains judicial reluctance to allow
neighbors to invoke issue preclusion doctrine.133

127. 155 A.2d 83 (N.J. 1959).
128. Id. at 88.
129. The court held that “[a] decision on self-created hardship, without more, is not
conclusive on the determinative issue of undue hardship.” Id. at 89 (citation omitted).
130. Id.
131. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. i (1982) (“If a judgment of a court
of first instance is based on determinations of two issues, either of which standing independently
would be sufficient to support the result, the judgment is not conclusive with respect to either
issue standing alone.”).
132. Id.
133. Cf. Laurel Beach Ass’n v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 785 A.2d 1169, 1176 (Conn. App.
Ct. 2001) (noting that a determinative issue in a second proceeding was not key to prior
determination); Petrillo v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 841 N.E.2d 266, 272 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006)
(noting that a determinative issue in a second proceeding was neither essential to the decision of,
nor actually litigated in, a prior proceeding).
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5. Interpretations
Applications for variances, special permits, and subdivisions all
require the zoning board or other administrative body to apply an
ordinance’s legal standards to a set of facts that include the composition
of the existing neighborhood and the details of the landowner’s
application. Because the facts change with subsequent applications,
preclusion doctrines are of little assistance to neighbors. The situation is
different when a landowner seeks an interpretation of the zoning
ordinance. The board’s decision on an interpretation is not generally
subject to the same kind of change, and neighbors may, therefore,
prevent the board from issuing a subsequent and contrary interpretation
to the same landowner.
Cosby v. Board of Zoning Appeals134 furnishes an example. As part
of a landowner’s application for a special exception, the planning
commission sought an opinion about whether a proposed rock crusher
would be a nonconforming use. The Board of Zoning Appeals
concluded that it would be nonconforming, and a court affirmed. On
those facts, the court concluded that no changed circumstances could
exist and that a subsequent board (and subsequent court) was bound by
res judicata doctrine.
C. Preclusion Claims by Zoning Boards of Appeals
The preceding Section established that claim preclusion doctrine
does not bind a zoning board to its prior determinations on applications
for variances and special permits; courts almost universally permit
zoning boards to entertain repeat applications. This subordination of
finality concerns reflects several realities about the land use process. A
second determination may generate long-term efficiency gains where
changes in the proposed land use or the neighborhood’s circumstances
suggest that the first determination was “wrong.” Requiring landowners
to apply for multiple and inconsistent forms of relief upon an initial
application would be both costly and inefficient. Moreover, the
availability of legislative relief for a disappointed landowner limits the
reliance interests of victorious neighbors. These realities lead courts to
acquiesce in zoning board decisions to rehear previously decided
applications.
Suppose, however, a zoning board invokes preclusion doctrine to
avoid hearing a new application from a landowner whose earlier
application for a variance or a special permit was unsuccessful. If claim
preclusion doctrine does not bar reconsideration of an application,
should due process of law require the board to decide each new
application on the merits? The nearly universal judicial answer is no.
134. 7 Va. Cir. 253 (1985).
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That answer makes practical sense. In many cases, circumstances
have not changed significantly since the board denied the landowner’s
first application, the two applications are substantially similar (or nearly
identical), and any new evidence or arguments advanced by the
landowner easily could have been anticipated at the time of the first
application. In these circumstances, requiring a new hearing on the
merits would generate no efficiency gains to compensate for the
efficiency and fairness concerns that lie behind finality doctrines.
On each of these issues—the significance of any change in external
circumstances, the similarity of the two applications, and the relevance
of new evidence (and its availability at the time of the first hearing)—
the zoning board has more experience and more expertise than a
reviewing court. Just as courts typically defer to other zoning board
decisions within areas of board expertise,135 courts defer to board
determinations that denial of a landowner’s prior application precludes a
different decision on a subsequent application. As in other areas of land
use law, however, deference does not mean abdication. Courts do
engage in a form of rational basis review. Most critically, preclusion
principles do not permit a board to deny a subsequent application
without hearing the applicant’s claim that circumstances have changed
since the prior application. The cases can best be understood as a
combination of issue preclusion and deference principles: issue
preclusion principles bind the applicant to the board’s prior
determination with respect to issues actually litigated and necessarily
determined, while deference principles limit the willingness of courts to
second-guess the board’s decision that there were no changes in the
circumstances or the application to make the current issue different
from the one resolved in the prior proceeding.
1. Change of Circumstances Cases
Suppose a zoning board denies a variance to a landowner who
wants to erect a multiple-unit apartment building on a parcel of land
zoned for a single-family dwelling. One year later, the same landowner
reapplies for the same use variance, citing changes in the neighborhood
including the construction of an apartment complex two blocks away.
According to the landowner, this change has had such a significant
impact on the character of the community that his claim of unnecessary
hardship is much stronger and warrants reconsideration. If the zoning
board disagrees and summarily denies the second application, will a
court overturn the board’s determination?
A court generally does not exercise its independent judgment to
135. See, e.g., Retail Prop. Trust v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 774 N.E.2d 727, 731 (N.Y.
2002) (noting that deference to the board is appropriate on a “fact-specific choice of the kind
that local boards are uniquely suited to make”).
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determine whether a landowner’s repeat application is different enough
to warrant reconsideration.136 Instead, courts defer to the zoning board’s
determination that no material facts have changed. In reaching this
outcome, courts, often implicitly, employ a two-step process. First, the
court applies issue preclusion to all issues fully litigated and necessarily
decided in the initial application. Second, the court defers to the zoning
board’s determination that the two applications are so similar as to bar
reconsideration of the subsequent application.
Deference to the zoning board’s assessment of changed
circumstances is so well-established that many of the opinions
upholding a zoning board’s invocation of res judicata do not even
discuss the facts of the two applications; rather, they summarily assert
that the board was within its discretion to find no material changes had
occurred.137 Courts recognize that just as the board is in the best
position to determine that a new application is sufficiently different to
warrant reconsideration,138 it is also in the best position to decide that
changed facts are not significant enough to constitute a material change.
This practice is consistent with the goal of efficient decisionmaking
in land use applications. There is nothing to be gained from requiring
the zoning board to reconsider an application based on the occurrence of
an inconsequential change, when the board inevitably will reject the
application for the same reasons as the initial denial. Returning to the
hypothetical, the construction of an apartment complex two blocks
away from the subject site indisputably altered the total mix of
information available to the zoning board. Nevertheless, the board was
best situated, practically, to determine whether the change would
influence its decision in any way. As a result, a court would uphold the
board’s exercise of discretion to deny the second variance application
without a full rehearing on the merits. 139
136. See, e.g., Barlow v. Planning Bd., 832 N.E.2d 1161, 1167 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005)
(alteration in original) (quoting Davis v. Zoning Bd., 754 N.E.2d 101, 106 (Mass. App. Ct.
2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“Even if the record reveals that a desired special
permit could lawfully be granted by the board because the applicant’s evidence satisfied the
statutory and regulatory criteria, the board retains discretionary authority to deny the permit . . . ,
so long as that denial is not based upon a legally untenable or arbitrary and capricious ground.”).
137. See, e.g., Miller v. Booth, 702 So. 2d 290, 291 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (“In the
instant case, we find that the Board of County Commissioners acted within its discretion when it
determined that a substantial change in circumstances had not occurred . . . .”); Hasam Realty
Corp. v. Dade Cnty., 486 So. 2d. 9, 9 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (“[T]he commission could
properly have found, in its discretion, that there were no significant differences as to the vital
issues of density, traffic, and the like, between the instant application and one which had been
previously rejected . . . .”); Pettit v. Bd. of Appeals, 554 N.Y.S.2d 723, 724 (App. Div. 1990)
(citations omitted) (“At bar, the Board’s finding that there were ‘no material differences’
between [the landowner’s] proposed application and [the previous landowner’s] prior
application . . . ‘was clearly not arbitrary’ or an abuse of discretion . . . .”).
138. See supra Subsection III.B.2.a.
139. Similarly, in Calapai v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 871 N.Y.S.2d 288 (App. Div.
2008), the zoning board had granted the landowner a variance to temporarily convert her garage
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The principle that courts defer to zoning board determinations that
conditions have not changed is subject to two qualifications. First, the
zoning board must hold a hearing to determine whether material
changes have occurred.140 Second, when the board’s conclusion that
circumstances have not changed is arbitrary, courts may intervene to
require a rehearing.
First, consider the board’s procedural obligation. Statutes generally
require a zoning board to hold a hearing on an application for a variance
or a special permit.141 Once a board holds a hearing and makes a
decision, issue preclusion prevents relitigation of the issues actually and
necessarily decided. But issue preclusion doctrine always affords a
litigant a hearing to argue that particular issues were not actually or
necessarily decided. When a landowner applicant argues that
circumstances have changed since the prior decision, the landowner is
effectively arguing that the issues in the second proceeding were not
actually or necessarily determined in the first hearing. The applicant is
right if circumstances have changed, but wrong if circumstances have
not changed. The board, therefore, must hold a hearing on that critical
issue: whether circumstances have changed.142
Thus, in Kreisberg v. Scheyer,143 the court refused to defer to the
arbitrary action of the zoning board in rejecting a landowner’s petition
for an area variance solely on the grounds that twenty years prior, a
into a bedroom for her paraplegic son, with the condition that she restore the property to its
original use as a garage if a change in circumstances should occur. Id. at 289. After her son’s
death, the board granted her a three-year extension of the variance, renewable at the board’s
discretion, but refused to abrogate the restriction entirely as the landowner requested. Id. at 289–
90. In upholding the board’s determination that no material change of circumstances had
occurred to warrant consideration of the landowner’s petition, the New York appellate court
reasoned that the only change in circumstance—her son’s death—was not unanticipated and was
taken into consideration by the board in its previous decision. Id. at 290.
140. See Rhema Christian Ctr. v. D.C. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 515 A.2d 189, 194 (D.C.
1986) (“[S]ummary disposition is not an option unless the second application is identical to the
first and no change of circumstances is alleged.”); Stoneback v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 699 A.2d
824, 827 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997) (“Generally, the Board is required to provide an applicant an
opportunity to present evidence of an alleged substantial change in conditions or circumstances
related to the land itself before determining whether res judicata is applicable.”).
141. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2310 (2011) (requiring hearing on applications for
special exceptions and variances).
142. Of course, if a landowner-applicant does not attempt to show a change in
circumstances, the zoning board is within its discretion to summarily deny the second
application without a hearing. See Burger King Corp. v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 349 So. 2d 210,
211–12 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (upholding a zoning board’s rejection of Burger King’s
variance application to use professional office space as a restaurant on the ground of res
judicata, where the board previously rejected a predecessor-in-interest’s similar application and
Burger King did not attempt to show changed circumstances); Metro. Dade Cnty. Bd. of Cnty.
Comm’rs v. Rockmatt Corp., 231 So. 2d 41, 44 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (upholding the
zoning board’s invocation of res judicata where the landowner did not attempt to show a change
in circumstances since the denial of the landowner’s similar application one year prior for a
special exception to enlarge a building and a variance to operate a nightclub).
143. 808 N.Y.S.2d 889 (Sup. Ct. 2006).
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different landowner had submitted a variance application with
dissimilar setback proposals and size dimensions.144 The court
remanded the application, requiring the zoning board to hold a hearing
on whether circumstances had changed between the two applications.
The second limitation on a board’s application of res judicata
doctrine is substantive rather than procedural. Courts will not defer to
an “arbitrary and capricious” zoning board determination that
circumstances have not changed.145 Moore v. Town of Islip Zoning
Board of Appeals146 illustrates the point. The zoning board refused to
hear a landowner’s application for an area variance based on a prior
owner’s failed area variance application approximately twenty years
earlier, stating that no change of circumstances had occurred. Although
the trial court upheld the zoning board’s determination, a New York
appellate court reversed, emphasizing the time gap between the two
applications.147 The court held that it was arbitrary and capricious to
find that the character and conditions in the neighborhood had not
materially changed since the initial application.148
2. Change of Application Cases
Suppose that a zoning board rejects a landowner’s application for a
variance to build a twenty-unit apartment complex with a parking lot on
the east side of the property, adjacent to a daycare center. In rejecting
the proposal, the board states that the location of the parking lot presents
an unacceptable safety hazard for the children in the daycare center. Of
what effect is the board’s denial if the landowner reapplies for a
variance to erect a ten-unit complex with a parking lot in the same
location? Would the board be entitled to reject the application without
considering the merits anew?
The answer is and should be yes. Issue preclusion allows a zoning
board to dismiss a subsequent application that does not address a defect
relied upon by the board in denying the prior application. In the given
hypothetical, the landowner changed the lot density, but failed to
144. Id. at 890–92.
145. See, e.g., Anderson v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 217 P.3d 401, 405 (Wyo. 2009) (“We
continue to apply the arbitrary and capricious standard as a ‘safety net’ designed to ‘catch
agency action which prejudices a party’s substantial rights . . . .’”).
There is no precise formula for what a court will deem arbitrary and capricious behavior in
the land use context, but case law suggests that it is only in the most extreme circumstances that
the courts will interfere with the discretion of the zoning board and overturn a board’s
determination of res judicata. Courts are more likely to deem the zoning board’s refusal to hear
a landowner’s application arbitrary when the denial is based on a previous application that was
brought (1) by a different landowner, (2) decades earlier, (3) with different proposed details in
the application.
146. 813 N.Y.S.2d 542 (App. Div. 2006).
147. Id. at 543.
148. Id.
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alleviate the board’s objection to the hazardous location of the parking
lot. Therefore, issue preclusion would permit the board to reject the
subsequent application as not materially different from the prior
application.149
On the other hand, if a subsequent application does not raise the
issue that led the board to deny the initial application, the board cannot
rely on issue preclusion to reject the new application. As already
noted,150 efficiency concerns mandate that an applicant not be required
to offer, in a single application, every possible alternative development
plan when the landowner wants to develop only one of those plans. As a
result, the process of applying for special permits, site plan approval,
and even variances, necessarily involves a dialogue between the
landowner and the administrative body in which each side educates the
other about its concerns. If denial of one application precluded a
landowner from subsequently submitting an application that resolved
the issue that led to the first denial, the landowner would never be able
to respond to the reasons articulated by the board for rejecting the
earlier application. For that reason, prior board determinations are
entitled only to issue preclusion, not claim preclusion effect.
Courts will defer to the zoning board’s determination that its
articulated reasons for rejecting the initial application are dispositive in
the subsequent request for relief. That is, if the board concludes that
changes in the new application do not address the reasons for the earlier
rejection, then the board can invoke preclusion doctrine to decline full
consideration of the new application. As with any matter of issue
preclusion, the board at least must afford the applicant landowner a
hearing to determine whether the subsequent application is sufficiently
different to warrant reconsideration.151
The following scenarios illustrate the point. First, consider an easy
case. Suppose that a zoning board denies a use variance application on
the ground that the landowner failed to show the land could not generate
a reasonable return as presently zoned.152 Issue preclusion binds the
149. Indeed, issue preclusion doctrine might not merely allow, but rather require, the board
to deny the subsequent application, because the board actually and necessarily determined that
the parking lot created an unacceptable safety hazard. On the other hand, the board might
conclude that with only ten units, the risks associated with the parking lot are more tolerable
than with twenty units.
150. See supra Subsection III.B.2.
151. If the zoning board determines that a subsequent application is significantly different,
the board can no longer rely on issue preclusion to reject the application and is required to
consider the application on the merits. Cf. Hurley v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 893 N.Y.S.2d 277,
278–79 (App. Div. 2010).
152. The most commonly embraced test for a use variance was set forth in the seminal case
of Otto v. Steinhilber, 24 N.E.2d 851 (N.Y. 1939). The landowner:
must show that (1) the land in question cannot yield a reasonable return if used
only for a purpose allowed in that zone; (2) that the plight of the owner is due to
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board to this determination, even if a subsequent application changes
the requested use entirely, because the initial determination established
that the subject parcel did not meet one of the essential elements to
qualify for a use variance.153
Now suppose that a zoning board rejects a subdivision application to
convert a parcel of land into eighteen single-family lots due to the
inadequacy of the access road in the plan.154 Four years later, the
landowner reapplies to the zoning board having increased the density
from eighteen to twenty-five lots and enlarged the open space area, but
still requesting to use the same access road that the board had
previously rejected.155 Even though the application has undoubtedly
changed in several aspects since the board’s initial denial, the
landowner has failed to obviate the board’s objections to the access
road. The changes are not material in light of the reasons for the board’s
initial denial. The previously rejected application is thus dispositive, and
the board need not consider the subsequent application on the merits.
In contrast, if a new application is materially different and the
defects that led to the initial denial are cured or irrelevant to the
subsequent application, the zoning board cannot invoke issue preclusion
to refuse to consider the application.156 Grasso v. Zoning Board of
Appeals157 is instructive. The landowner applied for a zoning permit and
coastal site plan approval to install a concrete support in his shoreline
property to prevent erosion. The board denied the application, citing the
landowner’s lack of compliance with certain statutory and regulatory
provisions. Two years later, the landowner submitted a second
application that he claimed addressed the defects of his first application.
In remanding the matter to the zoning board, the Connecticut Appellate
Court held that the board was required to hold a hearing to consider
whether the application in fact corrected the initial application’s

unique circumstances and not to the general conditions in the neighborhood
which may reflect the unreasonableness of the zoning ordinance itself; and (3)
that the use to be authorized by the variance will not alter the essential character
of the locality.
Id. at 853 (emphasis added).
153. Cf. id.
154. These facts are those of Davidson v. Kitsap County, 937 P.2d 1309, 1311–12 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1997).
155. Id. at 1312.
156. For example, in Josato, Inc. v. Wright, 733 N.Y.S.2d 214 (App. Div. 2001), the
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York found res judicata inapplicable and
required the zoning board to consider the merits of the landowner’s use variance application
where the previous petition was made by a different applicant, involved different proposals for
constructing houses on the property, and was prior to the amendment of the Town Law. Id. at
215.
157. 794 A.2d 1016 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002).
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deficiencies.158 If the defects were addressed, the zoning board would
be required to consider the application on its merits.
3. Identical Applications/New Evidence Cases
Suppose that a landowner, having been previously denied a use
variance, reapplies for an identical variance, arguing that she has
gathered additional evidence to support her claim of unique hardship to
her parcel of land. As discussed earlier,159 a court would likely permit a
zoning board to consider the landowner’s repeat application,
characterizing the new evidence as a “material change in
circumstances.” However, would a court also uphold a zoning board’s
decision to summarily refuse to hear the new evidence?
The answer is yes. When a zoning board declines to hear new
evidence, courts invariably defer to the board’s determination
(provided, of course, that the board abided by proper procedures).160
This is consistent with ordinary issue preclusion principles, which bar
an unsuccessful litigant from making a duplicative request for relief—to
the extent the issue has been fully and necessarily determined—on the
sole basis of additional evidence.
Even when a zoning board permits submission of additional
evidence, the board is still within its discretion to find that the new
information does not constitute a material change in circumstance to
overcome issue preclusion. Consider Jensen v. Zoning Board of
Appeals.161 Two years after the zoning board denied a landowner’s
request for an area variance to build a single-family residence on his lot,
the landowner reapplied for an identical variance. The landowner
presented evidence in the second hearing that the value of the lot with
the variance increased threefold.162 The New York appellate court
upheld the zoning board’s rejection of the second application, asserting
that only “the quality of his proof, not . . . the facts themselves[,] had
158. Id. at 1027–28 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“The fact that a
prior site plan did not comply does not allow the zoning commission to turn down one which
does.”).
159. See supra Subsection III.B.2.b.
160. For instance, Palmieri Cove Associates v. New Haven Zoning Board of Appeals, No.
CV054013158S, 2008 WL 2930238 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 3, 2008), illustrates the deference
courts accord to board determinations. A landowner submitted a duplicative use variance
application to utilize his property as a slip marina, after having been rejected one year earlier.
The landowner attempted to submit new evidence in the form of an affidavit from the previous
landowner “that it was never her intention to abandon the use of the property as a marina.” Id. at
*1 (internal quotation marks omitted). The board refused to consider the new information,
invoking res judicata as to the previously rejected application. The Superior Court of
Connecticut upheld the board’s rejection of the new evidence, deferring to the board’s
determination that no material change of circumstances had occurred. Id. at *3.
161. 515 N.Y.S.2d 283 (App. Div. 1987).
162. Id. at 284–85.

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol63/iss5/3

42

Sterk and Brunelle: Zoning Finality: Reconceptualizing Res Judicata Doctrine in Land

2011]

ZONING FINALITY

1181

changed.”163
This case stands in some contrast to those that uphold zoning board
decisions to reconsider identical applications based solely on the
introduction of new information.164 In both instances, however, courts
defer to the zoning board’s determination about whether to reconsider
its decision in light of additional information.165 This deference reflects
the informational advantages enjoyed by the zoning board—both with
respect to the factors that led to its prior determination and with respect
to the longterm inefficiencies that would be generated by an “incorrect”
zoning board decision.
Recall that zoning boards may not summarily reject a new
application that is materially different from the initial relief requested or
that cures defects which led to the initial denial. This is because the
give-and-take process between a landowner and a zoning board is
significantly more efficient than requiring an applicant to bring forth all
possible requests for relief in the initial application. In contrast, a zoning
board may summarily reject an identical application in which the only
purported “change” is additional evidence, because there are no
efficiency advantages in permitting a landowner to submit the same
application multiple times, altered only by different supporting
evidence.
D. The Impact of Statutes and Judicial Decisions
on the Power to Reconsider
The focus of this Article so far has been on the res judicata effect a
board decision has on the same board in a subsequent proceeding. But
local land use boards are creatures of statute, and statutes have the
capacity to override the principles that would otherwise apply.
Moreover, board decisions are subject to judicial review, and one might
surmise that a judicial decision affirming (or reversing) a board decision
would have res judicata consequences different from those that would
163. Id. at 285.
164. See supra Subsection III.B.2.b.
165. Notably, in Jensen, the landowner unsuccessfully had appealed the board’s original
denial of the identical application. Thus, the landowner had the opportunity to diligently bring
forth all of his evidence not only at the initial zoning board hearing, but also at the judicial
proceeding, in which he likely had the assistance of legal counsel. The court refused to require
the zoning board to consider the new evidence to be a material change of circumstance where
the landowner failed to avail himself of multiple opportunities to show the augmented value of
the property with a variance. 515 N.Y.S.2d at 284–85.
The case is harder when an initial variance application is not appealed, and there is no
judicial proceeding or legal counsel to impress upon the landowner the importance of
thoroughly presenting all relevant evidence in existence at the time. It is more likely, in such a
scenario, that the landowner imprudently failed to gather all significant evidence under the
mistaken assumption that he could reapply later and assemble more persuasive information.
Nevertheless, a zoning board still is entitled to invoke the doctrine of issue preclusion and reject
a landowner’s duplicative application based solely on new evidence.
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flow from the board decision itself. This Subsection explores those
issues.
1. Statutory Directives
Because res judicata is a common law doctrine, its command must
yield to statutory directives that limit or expand the doctrine’s scope. No
states appear to have enacted statutes that explicitly address the res
judicata effect of zoning board determinations, but a number of statutes
and ordinances prohibit reconsideration of an application for a specified
period of time. A broad reading of these statutes implicitly would limit
the scope of res judicata doctrine.
The Massachusetts statute illustrates this problem. The statute
provides, in essence, that once an application has been disapproved, the
permit-granting authority shall not approve the application within two
years unless a supermajority finds that there has been a material change
in circumstances and all but one member of the planning board
consents.166 This statute raises two potential conflicts with res judicata
doctrine. First, suppose a landowner alters his application for a special
permit or variance and submits the amended application before the end
of the two-year period. Does the statute preclude application of res
judicata doctrine because the statute provides the exclusive remedy for
reapplications during the two-year period? Second, suppose a
landowner resubmits her original application more than two years after
the board denied that application. Does the statute implicitly require the
board to consider the resubmitted application on the merits, preventing
any application of res judicata doctrine after the expiration of the twoyear period? Other statutes and ordinances raise similar issues.167
166. The relevant portion of the statute provides:
No appeal, application or petition which has been unfavorably and finally acted
upon by the special permit granting or permit granting authority shall be acted
favorably upon within two years after the date of final unfavorable action
unless said special permit granting authority or permit granting authority finds,
by a unanimous vote of a board of three members or by a vote of four members
of a board of five members or two-thirds vote of a board of more than five
members, specific and material changes in the conditions upon which the
previous unfavorable action was based, and describes such changes in the
record of its proceedings, and unless all but one of the members of the planning
board consents thereto and after notice is given to parties in interest of the time
and place of the proceedings when the question of such consent will be
considered.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40A, § 16 (West 2010).
167. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-6 (West 2010). For cases construing ordinances
that specify time limits for reapplication, see, for example, Rhema Christian Center v. District of
Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment, 515 A.2d 189, 195–96 (D.C. 1986), and Moulton v.
Board of Zoning Appeals, 555 N.W.2d 39, 45–46 (Neb. 1996).
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The authority is clear on the first issue. Even if a statute purports to
bar reapplication for a specified period, courts do not construe the bar to
prevent reconsideration when the applicant can show either that the
application itself is different or that the circumstances surrounding the
application have changed. For instance, in Ranney v. Board of Appeals,
a Massachusetts appeals court held that the statutory ban did not bar a
new special permit application materially different from an application
rejected by the same board less than a month earlier.168 The court
explicitly indicated that courts should defer to a board’s determination
that the circumstances surrounding the new application are materially
different from those at issue in the first application.169
The second, more difficult issue is whether a time-limited ban on
reapplications effectively requires boards to reconsider reapplications
on the merits once the statutory time period has expired, implicitly
displacing preclusion doctrine. Start with the premise that a statute like
the Massachusetts statute must have been designed to have some
application. Issue preclusion doctrine would (even absent the statute)
prevent a board from considering identical applications before
expiration of the statutory ban. The statute does not purport to prevent a
board from considering different applications or changed circumstances,
either before or after the expiration of the ban. One might argue,
therefore, that for the statute to have any effect, the statute should be
read to require a board to consider, on the merits, an application
identical to one already rejected, so long as the second application is
made after expiration of the statutory time period.
Although the case law is sparse, at least one court has held that a
board must consider a nearly identical application after expiration of the
statutory time period. In Moulton v. Board of Zoning Appeals,170 the
Nebraska Supreme Court held that a provision in the Lincoln Municipal
Code prohibiting applications for “substantially similar variance[s] . . .
within one year” prevented the board from invoking res judicata after
expiration of the one year period.171
Other courts have suggested the opposite conclusion—that res
judicata doctrine continues to apply despite enactment of a statutory
time limit.172 The concern that prompts statutory time limits is
168. 414 N.E.2d 373, 374–75 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981). Other cases reaching similar
conclusions in other states include Winchester v. W.A. Foote Memorial Hospital, Inc., 396
N.W.2d 456, 462 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986), and Peterson v. City Council, 574 P.2d 326, 330–31
(Or. Ct. App. 1978).
169. Ranney, 414 N.E.2d at 376.
170. 555 N.W.2d 39 (Neb. 1996).
171. Id. at 45–46. Of course, it is clear that a board would be entitled to consider an
application anew after expiration of the period. See State ex rel. DeZeeuw v. Manitowoc Cnty.
Bd. of Adjustment, No. 91-0914, 478 N.W.2d 596, 1991 WL 285894, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov.
20, 1991) (per curiam).
172. Rhema Christian Ctr., 515 A.2d at 196; Coral Reef Nurseries, Inc. v. Babcock Co.,
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undoubtedly the same one that underlies judicial development of
preclusion doctrine: protecting zoning boards against repetitious
applications while preserving flexibility to adapt to circumstances that
change over time. Indeed, some statutes make that clear by providing
only that no board “shall be required” to hear a new application within
the statutory period, impliedly giving a board the discretion to apply res
judicata doctrine.173 Moulton, then, may be an outlier; most courts
appear unlikely to treat these statutes as undermining ordinary res
judicata principles.
Other statutory provisions regulate “rehearings” of an application
without making it clear how, if at all, a rehearing is different from a
new, but substantially similar, application. These statutes, which often
make no reference to the time frame for a rehearing, typically have no
impact on preclusion doctrine. For instance, New York statutes
authorize a zoning board to rehear an application upon a unanimous
vote of the board.174 Statutes like this one, which impose procedural
hurdles before a board may rehear an application, do not undermine
preclusion doctrine except in the limited circumstances where the
applicant surmounts those high procedural hurdles.
2. Prior Judicial Decisions
How does judicial review of a prior board decision affect the
application of preclusion principles? Unlike a prior unreviewed board
determination, a judicial decision carries with it an important aspect of
claim preclusion doctrine: the determination bars not only relitigation of
the issue actually and necessarily determined in the first judicial
proceeding (the usual issue preclusion effect), but also relitigation of all
claims and issues the aggrieved party could have raised in that earlier
proceeding.
Freddolino v. Village of Warwick Zoning Board of Appeals175
illustrates the point. The landowner sought an area variance from a
zoning requirement limiting total development coverage to forty percent
410 So. 2d 648, 653 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Marks v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 203 A.2d
761, 763–64 (R.I. 1964). Note, however, that only in Marks was the court’s conclusion
necessary to the resolution of the case. See id. at 764. In Coral Reef, the court’s ultimate
conclusion was that the board was entitled to entertain a subsequent application, 410 So. 2d at
655, and in Rhema the court refrained from “imposing [its] own construction of the regulation”
pending an interpretation from the board. 515 A.2d at 196.
173. See Root v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 565 A.2d 14, 16 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1989) (citation
omitted).
174. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 267-a(12) (McKinney 2011); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-712-a(12)
(McKinney 2011). New York courts, however, have construed the statute to require presentation
of new facts. Freddolino v. Vill. of Warwick Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 596 N.Y.S.2d 490, 492
(App. Div. 1993); see also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 677:2 (2011) (authorizing rehearing within
thirty days if, in the board’s opinion, “good reason therefor is stated in the motion”).
175. 596 N.Y.S.2d 490 (App. Div. 1993).
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of the total square footage of the landowner’s parcel. When the zoning
board denied the variance, the landowner sought judicial review,
contending that the denial was arbitrary and capricious. Four months
after the court dismissed the landowner’s petition, he applied for the
same variance, introducing expert testimony to support a claim of
hardship. When the board again denied the variance, concluding that the
landowner had not demonstrated any change in circumstances, the
applicant again sought judicial review, this time adding constitutional
claims to the claim that the denial was arbitrary and capricious.176 In
dismissing the constitutional claims, the court observed that those
claims could have been raised in the initial proceeding, and that res
judicata principles precluded the landowner from raising them in the
second proceeding.177
If the landowner in Freddolino had not sought judicial review of the
board’s first denial, issue preclusion principles would not have barred
the landowner from advancing the constitutional attack after the second
denial. The zoning board itself would not have been equipped to
consider the constitutional challenge, and from the standpoint of judicial
economy, there would be little reason to require the landowner to bring
a judicial challenge to the initial determination when the landowner still
hoped that the board would approve some version of the project once
educated by supplementary materials. After the board’s rejection of a
subsequent application, therefore, he would have been entitled to bring
the constitutional claim. But because the landowner actually challenged
the first determination in court, the judicial economy calculus was
significantly different; there was every reason for the court to insist that
the landowner raise all judicially cognizable claims in the same
proceeding—the usual claim preclusion rule.
On the other hand, a judicial decision upholding a variance or
special permit denial does not preclude the zoning board from granting
a landowner’s subsequent application when either the circumstances or
the substance of the landowner’s application have changed.178 In this
176. Id. at 491–92. The landowner argued that the forty percent limit was unconstitutional
on its face and as applied. Id. at 492.
177. Id. at 492–93. The court acknowledged that as a matter of New York procedure, the
landowner would have had to convert the challenge to the board’s action to a declaratory
judgment proceeding in order to raise the constitutional claim, but observed that there was no
impediment to such a conversion. Id. at 492.
178. Indeed, in In re Clute v. Town of Wilton Zoning Board of Appeals, 611 N.Y.S.2d 710
(App. Div. 1994), the court went one step further. In Clute, a court earlier had overturned a
zoning board’s grant of an area variance because the board had not properly weighed the
statutory factors. Id. at 711. The court held that the judicial determination did not prevent a
successor-in-interest, who purchased the parcel from the initial applicant, from seeking the same
area variance the court had overturned already, provided that the applicant produced “additional
evidence other than that submitted on the prior application to avoid the preclusive effect of [the
court’s] prior decision . . . .” Id. at 712.
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respect, the judicial decision, like a prior board decision, has only issue
preclusive effect; if the board decides that the subsequent application
should be granted because the new application raises issues it had not
considered on the first application, the board is free to do so. For
instance, in Filanowski v. Zoning Board of Adjustment,179 the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the grant of a variance to build an
apartment complex in a single-family district despite the same board’s
denial of a variance, affirmed by a court, several years earlier. The court
noted that since the prior variance denial, the city had rezoned abutting
land to permit apartments—a change of circumstance that entitled the
board to consider the application, unconstrained by its prior decision.
And in Bressman v. Gash,180 the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld
a variance grant, in the face of a prior judicial decision adverse to the
landowner, where the landowner’s application, rather than
circumstances, had changed. In Bressman, the zoning board had initially
granted the landowner a variance from the ordinance’s rear setback
requirement. While neighbors challenged the grant, the landowner built
the house in reliance on the variance, only to have the Appellate
Division reverse the trial court’s decision upholding the variance. The
landowner then exchanged some land with a neighbor to increase the
distance between his house and the rear lot line, reducing the magnitude
of the variance he needed. When the town planning board approved the
landowner’s newly submitted variance application,181 the neighbors
sought judicial review, invoking res judicata doctrine. The New Jersey
Supreme Court held that the planning board had not acted arbitrarily in
concluding that differences between the two applications justified
consideration of the second application on the merits.
To summarize, then, the effect of a prior judicial decision on a
landowner’s variance or special permit application is identical to the
effect of a board decision, with one significant exception: if a party
seeks judicial review of a board decision, an adverse judicial decision
bars the party from advancing, on a subsequent application, any claims
that the party could have raised in the initial litigation. It is only to that
extent that a judicial decision has any claim preclusive effect on a
subsequent application.
E. Ohio Exceptionalism
Alone among the states, the Ohio courts appear inclined to apply
traditional claim preclusion doctrine to variance and special permit
179. 266 A.2d 670 (Pa. 1970).
180. 621 A.2d 476 (N.J. 1993).
181. Because the landowner needed minor subdivision approval with respect to the
exchange of land, the Board of Adjustment had transferred the variance application to the
planning board. Id. at 480.
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determinations by zoning boards. In Grava v. Parkman Township,182 a
4-3 majority of the Ohio Supreme Court overruled precedent by holding
that claim preclusion doctrine prevented a landowner who previously
had been denied a variance from later seeking to establish that the
landowner’s use was a pre-existing nonconforming use that did not
require a variance. Because the board itself had applied claim preclusion
principles to bar the landowner’s subsequent application, the court
could have applied principles of deference to reach the same result.183
But the court went out of its way to emphasize the need to provide
parties with an incentive to raise all issues at one time in order to
conserve judicial and quasi-judicial time and resources.184 As a result,
the court barred the landowner’s claim, even though the issue raised by
the landowner in the second proceeding (whether the use was a
nonconforming use) was different from the issue in the first proceeding
(whether the landowner was entitled to a variance).185 Although the
result is entirely consistent with traditional claim preclusion doctrine, it
is inconsistent with issue preclusion doctrine and with the approach
followed in other states.
In two subsequent cases, the Ohio appellate courts have invoked
Grava to permit neighbors to overturn variance grants when the board
previously had denied variances to the same landowners. In Rossow v.
City of Ravenna186 and Dinks II Co. v. Chagrin Falls Village Council,187
Ohio appellate courts emphasized that “[a]n appellate court applies a de
novo standard of review on a determination of whether an action is
barred by res judicata,”188 and concluded that, even though the second
application differed from the first in a number of particulars, res
judicata doctrine required invalidation of the board’s grant of the second
variance.189 These cases are very much at odds with the approach
182. 653 N.E.2d 226 (Ohio 1995).
183. Indeed, an earlier Ohio Supreme Court decision, Set Products, Inc. v. Bainbridge
Township Board of Zoning Appeals, 510 N.E.2d 373 (Ohio 1987), appeared to take this
approach, holding that a board’s determination that circumstances had not changed “will not be
questioned, absent a showing that the decision was arbitrary, unreasonable or constituted an
abuse of discretion.” Id. at 377. Although the Grava court cited the Ohio Supreme Court’s
decision, see Grava, 653 N.E.2d at 228, nowhere did it suggest comparable deference to board
determinations.
184. See Grava, 653 N.E.2d at 230.
185. Id. at 228; see also Bohach v. Advery, No. 00 CA 265, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 3425,
at *2–4, *18–19 (Ohio Ct. App. June 18, 2002) (applying the same approach on facts nearly
identical to those in Grava).
186. No. 2001-P-0036, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 1498 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2002).
187. No. 84939, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 2213 (Ohio Ct. App. May 12, 2005).
188. Rossow, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 1498, at *6; see also Dinks II, 2005 Ohio App
LEXIS 2213, at *12 (“The applicability of res judicata is a question of law that is subject to de
novo review.”).
189. In Rossow, the second application eliminated a request for a rear yard variance and
modified the request for side yard setbacks. 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 1498, at *8. In Dinks II, the
second application made provision for offsite employee parking. 2005 Ohio App LEXIS 2213,

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2011

49

Florida Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 5 [2011], Art. 3

1188

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

prevalent in other states.190
CONCLUSION
In the zoning context, as in other contexts, balancing flexibility and
finality presents significant challenges. General statements that zoning
board decisions are entitled to res judicata effect unless circumstances
have changed obfuscate the generally coherent pattern that courts follow
in evaluating preclusion claims. A close analysis of land use cases and
policy establishes that claim preclusion has no place in zoning doctrine;
rather, a combination of issue preclusion and judicial deference protects
boards and neighbors against landowners seeking to take multiple bites
out of the same apple.

at *18.
190. One Ohio appellate court has recognized that strict application of res judicata doctrine
would leave a landowner “forever barred from requesting a variance after having a variance
once denied despite one’s best effort to change one’s proposal to ameliorate the concerns of the
applicable board.” Davis v. Coventry Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, No. 20085, 2001 Ohio App.
LEXIS 513, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 14, 2001). In Davis, the court held that a board could not
invoke res judicata to deny landowner a variance different in several respects from the variance
the board had previously denied. The court distinguished Grava, noting that in that case, only
the landowner’s theory of relief, not the substance of landowner’s application, had changed. Id.
at *6–7.
In one important respect, however, the court’s approach in Davis is consistent with that
taken in Grava and applied in other Ohio cases. The court treated the preclusion issue as a pure
question of law, with no deference to the decision of the zoning board. Id. at *4. The principle
that courts should review de novo res judicata claims is inconsistent with the approach taken
outside of Ohio.
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